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DETERMINING THE RIGHTS AND
LIABILITIES OF THE REMITTER OF A
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT: A THEORY
APPLIED TO SOME UNSETTLED
QUESTIONS -
GREGORY E. MAGGS *
The rights of a remitter are the rights that the Code forgot.'
Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC" or the
"Code") strives to establish a concise set of rules to govern the millions
of negotiable instrument transactions that take place every day. For the
most part, it does an excellent job. The article spells out, in straight-
forward terms, the rights and liabilities of the vast majority of parties
who typically come into contact with checks and promissory notes,
such as makers, 2 issuers,' drawers," drawees,' indorsers," acceptors,' and
holders." Article 3, however, comes up short in its treatment of one
Copyright 1995, Gregory E. Maggs.
* Associate Professor of Law, The George Washington University National Law Center. The
author thanks Dean Jack Friedenthal and the National Law Center for providing generous
support for the research and writing of this essay. The author also thanks his many colleagues a(
the National Law Center for their useful comments on earlier drafts.
I WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND Cr AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 4-104:03 (1992).
2 See U.C.C. §§ 3-103(a)(5), 3-105(c), 3-412 (1990).
3 See id. §§ 3-105(c), 3-412.
4 See id. §§ 3-103(a) (3), 3-414.
5 See
	 3-103(a)(2), 3-408.
6 See id. §§ 3-204(b), 3-415.
See U.G.C. §§ 3-103(a)(1), 3-413.
See id. §§ 1-201(20), 3-301(i).
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important participant in many negotiable instrument transactions: the
remitter.
The present official text of article 3 defines a remitter as "a person
who purchases an instrument from its issuer if the instrument is pay-
able to an identified person other than the purchaser."9 Many transac-
tions involving cashier's checks,'° teller's checks," and money orders'2
involve a remitter:3 Banks and other institutions issue and sell these
instruments for their face value plus a small charge:4 For example,
suppose that a buyer wants to purchase an automobile, but the dealer
refuses to take a personal check. As an alternative way of paying for
the vehicle, the buyer may procure a cashier's check from a bank and
ask the bank to make the check payable to the dealer. In this transac-
tion, the buyer would be a remitter because the buyer is purchasing
an instrument, the cashier's check, from an issuer, the bank, and the
check is payable to a person other than its purchaser—it is payable to
the dealer rather than the buyer.
Unfortunately, apart from defining remitters, article 3 says almost
nothing about them. Although a few sections and official comments
mention them:5 the article does not give remitters the comprehensive
treatment afforded other participants in negotiable instrument trans-
actions. The article's silence has left uncertain a wide variety of basic
questions about the remitter's rights and liabilities. These questions
include, for example, whether a remitter can obtain a refund of the
purchase price of an instrument; whether a remitter can enforce an
instrument; whether a remitter makes transfer or presentment warran-
ties; and whether a remitter has implied contractual liabilities.
This essay attempts to show how courts should answer these and
many other unsettled issues. Part I explains why some people and
businesses enter into remitter transactions. Part II describes what little
the Uniform Commercial Code and other sources of law say about
9 Id. § 3-103(a) (11).
I° See id. § 5-104(g) (defining a cashier's check as "a draft with respect to which the drawer
and drawee are the same bank or branches of the same bank").
See id. § 3-104(h) (defining a teller's check as a "draft drawn by a bank (i) on another
bank, or (ii) payable at or through a bank").
12 Money orders vary in form, but most function like personal checks. See id. § 3-104 cmt.
4; Note, Personal Money Orders and Miler's Checks: Mavericks Under the UCC 67 CoLum. L. REV.
524, 527-28 (1967) [hereinafter Columbia Notel.
13 No one keeps statistics on the use of cashier's checks and similar instruments. The drafters
of the Code, apparently on the basis of experience, note that "it is more common" than not for
the purchasers of these instruments to be remitters. U.C.C. § 3-201 cmt. 2.
14 See Columbia Note, supra note 12, at 527-28.
13 See infra Part ILA (listing and discussing these sections and comments).
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remitters. Part III presents a framework for courts deciding questions
about remitters. It argues that courts should recognize the rights and
liabilities established by the Code and by precedent. Although courts
have the power to create additional rights and liabilities as a matter of
common law, in answering unsettled questions they should decline to
exercise that power except in very limited circumstances. Parts IV and
V apply this theory to a collection of issues about remitters' rights and
liabilities. Part VI states a brief conclusion.
I. USE OF REMITTER TRANSACTIONS
A party who wants to pay a sum of money generally can make the
payment in a variety of ways. A consumer, for example, might pay for
items purchased at a store in cash, by credit card, or with a check or
money order. A business similarly might pay for supplies with a funds
transfer or a letter of credit. Typically, consumers and businesses will
want to tailor their transactions to the specific circumstances of each
transaction.
The following discussion considers why some parties choose to
make payments by remitting negotiable instruments. It addresses both
legitimate and illegitimate uses of remitter transactions.
A. Legitimate Uses
Most people who use remitter transactions probably have legiti-
mate reasons They are not trying to cheat anyone or commit any form
of crime. They simply want to pay money in an economical form that
provides them suitable protection and is satisfactory to the party re-
ceiving payment.
A remitter is a person who purchases an instrument from its issuer
if the instrument is payable to a person other than the purchaser. 16
People become remitters, as a result, only after making two choices.
First, they decide to purchase an instrument issued by someone else.
Second, they decide to make the instrument payable to the person
receiving payment. Both decisions make sense in certain circum-
stances.
Some remitters purchase these instruments because they have to
pay money to a person who refuses to accept any other form of
payment. Most car dealers, for example, require their customers to pay
for new cars using one of these instruments. They will not take pay-
16 U.C.C. § 3-103(a) (1 O.
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ment by cash or credit card and generally do not accept personal
checks.
A person can justify refusing to take anything but a cashier's check
or teller's check because these instruments involve few risks. Unlike
personal checks, they almost never bounce. In addition, they generally
do not attract thieves the way that large sums of cash might. Moreover,
in contrast to other forms of payment, such as payment by credit card,
these instruments do not impose costs on the person receiving them."
Remitters also buy cashier's checks, teller's checks or money or-
ders because they do not have checking accounts and do not want to
pay in cash. A person with a small income, for example, may purchase
one of these instruments to facilitate sending money to a relative.
Although these instruments entail some risks," they do not involve the
perils associated with cash.
A person who decides to purchase a cashier's check, teller's check
or other instrument has several choices in determining how to com-
plete the instrument. For example, suppose a consumer decides to buy
a boat from a merchant using a cashier's check. The consumer could
make the instrument payable in three different ways.
First, the consumer could ask the bank to name the merchant as
the sole payee of the check. The consumer, in this case, would become
the remitter of the check." The consumer then could pay for the boat
simply by delivering the instrument to the merchant."
Second, the consumer could ask the bank to name both the
consumer and the merchant as alternative payees. For example, the
cashier's check could read: "Pay to the order of CONSUMER or MER-
CHANT."' Although the consumer would not qualify as a remitter, he
or she could pay for the boat simply by delivering the instrument.
Third, the consumer could ask the bank to name only the con-
sumer as the payee of the instrument. The consumer could pay for the
boat by indorsing the check and delivering it to the seller." Again, the
17 See generally National Bancard Corp. v. VISA USA., 596 F. Supp. 1231 (S.D. Fla. 1984),
aff 779 F.2d 592,595 (11th Cir. 1986) (outlining fees and charges associated with credit cards).
18 See, e.g., Santos v. First Nat'l State Bank, 451 A.2d 401,403 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982)
(check from son to father lost in the mail).
19 See U.C.C. § 3-103(a) (3).
211 See id. § 3-201(6) (indicating that a retainer may negotiate an instrument by transfer of
possession alone).
21 See id. § 3-110(d) (authorizing alternative payees).
22 See id. § 3-201(b) (requiring indorsement for negotiation by non-remitter). If the con-
sumer worried about indorser liability—i.e., liability if the bank does pay—the consumer could
indorse the check "without recourse" and thus disclaim the liability. Id. § 3-415(b).
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consumer, in this situation, would not fall within the definition of a
remitter.
The consumer faced with these alternatives may prefer the second
and third options to the first option because the rights of a remitter
remain quite unclear. By contrast, the Code is explicit about the rights
of the alternative or sole payee of a negotiable instrument. They not
only may negotiate the instrument, but also may enforce it."
The consumer's preferences, however, may have to give way to
those of the merchant. The merchant may prefer the first option, in
which the consumer becomes a remitter, for several reasons. Most
importantly, the merchant may not understand the other forms of
structuring the transaction. By custom, most people who use cashier's
checks to buy goods make the instrument payable to the merchant."
The merchant may not want to experiment with any other arrange-
ment.
The merchant also may hesitate to accept the other forms of
payment because they may involve additional risks. For example, the
merchant may worry that the second option, in which the bank lists
the consumer as an alternative payee, would allow the consumer to
steal the check and enforce it. The merchant may fear that the third
option, in which the bank lists only the consumer as a payee, will force
it to rely on the validity of the consumer's indorsement for its right to
enforce the instrument. If the merchant does not know the consumer,
the merchant runs the risk that the consumer has stolen the check and
is forging someone else's name.
In all these situations, the parties will work out the form of the
transaction according to their relative bargaining strength and their
willingness to give in on other factors, such as price. The merchant in
this example might be able to insist that the consumer become a
remitter. In another case, however, a supplier may not be able to dictate
the form of a cashier's check used by a business for payment. The result
simply depends on the circumstances.
23 Whether identified as an alternative payee or the sole payee, the consumer would become
a holder of the instrument. See id. §§ 1-201(20), 3-110 cmt. 4. As a holder, the consumer would
have the right to enforce the instrument, see id. § 3-301(i), and negotiate it, see id. § 3-201. See
also id. § 3-I 10(d) ("If an instrument is payable to two or more persons alternatively, it is payable
to any of them and may be negotiated, discharged, or enforced by any or all of them in possession
of the instrument?).
24 See U .C.C. § 3-201 tort. 2.
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B. Illegitimate Uses
Remitter transactions, at present, have one serious problem: crimi-
nals find them attractive because they afford anonymity. Although
cashier's checks and teller's checks generally contain a space to indi-
cate the remitter's name, the purchaser does not need to fill in the
name." A criminal thus may purchase and use one of these checks
without revealing much, if anything, about his or her identity. This
anonymity enables criminals to commit various forms of wrongdoing.
Some criminals use remitter transactions to defraud merchants.
One expert explains a typical scam used to buy expensive automobiles:
The perpetrator tells the car dealer that he intends to buy the
car. He then buys, under a phony name a cashier's check at
a prominent good-sized community bank for $32, and scans
the check on his personal computer, changing it to $32,000.
He goes back to pay the car dealer after 5 PM, when the banks
are closed and the dealer just assumes the check is valid. 26
In this situation, the perpetrator is a remitter and the dealer is the
payee of the check.
The ploy works because the bank and dealer pay little attention
to the identity of the remitter. The bank principally wants to know
whom it has to pay, not who bought the check. The dealer (not
thinking about the possibility that the check might be void) merely
wants to know which bank will pay the check. Newspapers regularly
run stories about swindlers who have gotten away with variations of this
simple ruse."
Other crooks use remitter transactions to "launder money"—that
is, to convert cash into something that authorities cannot trace and
that does not appear suspicious." For example, suppose a drug dealer
has several thousand dollars in $100 bills. The drug dealer, like anyone
else, would not want to keep this much cash sitting around the house
25 See Spears Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Century Nat'l Bank of New Orleans (In re Spears Carpet
Mills, Inc.), 86 B.R. 985, 993 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1987) ("Milling in of the remitter line on a
cashier's check is akin to filling in of the memo line on a personal check; helpful, but not
required, and of no legal effect."); cf. U.C.C. § 3-104(g) (1990) (defining cashier's check without
requiring a space to identify a remitter).
26 Expert Warns Banks to Beware of Forged Checks, BANE LErrea, Feb. 22, 1993, at 2.
22 See, e.g., Roy H. Campbell, Dealer Left Holding Bad Check, 'Doctor's' R/X for Porsche, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 1986, § 9 at 5; Jane Meinhardt, Buyer Uses Fake Checks for Used Cars, ST. PETERS-
BURG TIMES, July 22, 1992, at 1.
25 See generally Margaret Samuel, Non-cash Alternatives and Money Laundering, 1992 Am. Bus.
L.J. 69.
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because someone might steal it. Yet, the drug dealer also does not want
to open a bank account because tax or law enforcement authorities
might discover it.
A drug dealer typically solves this problem by using the cash to
buy cashier's checks, which afford safety and anonymity. The drug
dealer, of course, will not want to put his or her own name on the
checks. Instead, the drug dealer typically asks the bank to name as
payees either creditors or "fronts" who would be expected to receive a
cashier's check. The drug dealer thus becomes the remitter of the
checks without attracting much attention.
Many large money laundering operations involve some variation
of this scheme." In fact, the Treasury Department already has prom-
ulgated regulations to combat money laundering through remitter
transactions. These regulations generally require banks to verify and
record the identity of anyone purchasing a cashier's check for more
than $3000."
II. SOURCES OF LAW
Courts tend to consult three principal sources in deciding cases
about remitters: the text and official comments of the Code," prece-
dent decided before and after promulgation of the Code," and the
recommendations of treatises and law review articles." The following
sections describe the limited guidance that these sources provide.
29 See, e.g., flow Bankers Lent a Greedy Hand to Money Laundering Schemes, Am. BANKER, Feb.
15, 1985, at 4. See also Ellen J. Pollock & Viveca Novak, Capital Secret: There May Be Less to the
Whitewater Case than Meets the Eye, WALL Sr. J., Feb. 22, 1995, at Al (reporting allegations that
James McDougal bought a cashier's check in the name or Senatori William Fulbright and used
it to funnel an illegal payment to President Bill Clinton).
5° See Amendments to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations Relating to Identification Required
to Purchase Banks Checks and Drafts, Cashier's Checks, Money Orders, and Traveler's Checks,
59 Fed. Reg. 52,250, 52,252-53 (1994) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103.29).
31 See, e.g., Jerman v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 87 Cal. Rptr. 88, 92 (Ct. App.
1970) (citing pre-revision § 3-419(1)(c) as a basis for holding a bank liable to a remitter for
paying a cashier's check without proper indorsement); Lassen v. First Bank, 514 N.W.2d 831,
836-37 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (citing pre-revision § 3-419 cmt. 4 for the opposite conclusion).
32 See, e.g., Gillespie v. Riley Management Corp., 319 N.E.2d 753, 757 (III. 1974) (relying on
a precedent from 1889 and modern cases from Kansas, New York, and California in suiting that
a remitter may "cancel" or return a cashier's check prior to delivery); Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Delco
Corp., 195 S.E.2d 455, 457 (Ga. App. 1973) (rejecting precedents from New York holding that a
bank must pay a cashier's check to the payee even if the remitter has a claim to the instrument).
33 See, e.g., Louis Falcigno Enters., Inc. v. Massachusetts Bank & Trust Co., 436 N.E.2d 993,
994 (Mass. Ct. App. 1982) (citing law review articles, student notes, and a treatise for the
proposition that a bank may not assert defenses of a remitter as a ground for refining to pay
cashier's check).
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A. The Uniform Commercial Code
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted article 3
of the UCC." Two versions of the article, however, now exist. These
versions say slightly different things about remitters.
I. Official Text of the Pre-Revision Article 3
Prior to the 1990 revision of article 3, all states had enacted what
is now called the "pre-revision" version of article 3. The pre-revision
version came into existence in 1952, but went through minor changes
over the years." Although no longer controlling in most states, the
pre-revision version of article 3 has continuing relevance for two rea-
sons. First, it remains in force in the nineteen states and other juris-
dictions that have not yet adopted the revision. Second, because a wide
variety of precedent has accumulated under it, courts will continue to
consult it when deciding new remitter cases.
The pre-revision version of article 3 mentions remitters in only
one provision. Section 3-102(1)(a) describes the "issue" of an instru-
ment as "the first delivery of an instrument to a holder or a remitter.""
This section accords with the definition of remitter in the revised
article 3. Moreover, like official comment 4 to section 3-302 of the
revised article 3," section 3-102(1) (a) also implies that remitters differ
from holders.
Two official comments to the pre-revision Code also mention
remitters. Comment 1 to section 3-102 notes that the description of
issue differs from the definition in the Negotiable Instruments Law
(the "N.I.L.")," a uniform law promulgated in 1896 and eventually
34 See HENRY J. BAILEY ETA!.., BRADY ON BANK CIIECKS 1 1.7, at 1-11 (7th ed. 1992).
35 See id. Massachusetts adopted it in 1952, and Pennsylvania in 1957. See it MI of the other
states and various federal jurisdictions adopted it after it underwent various amendments in 1962.
See id. Slight modifications occurred in ensuing years. Unless otherwise indicated, when this essay
addresses the pre-revision version of article 3, it will discuss the final official text as it existed in
1989, immediately prior to the 1990 revision.
36 U.C.C. § 3-102(a) (1) (1989).
37 See id. § 3- 103(a) (11) (1990).
38 See id. § 3-302 cmt. 4 (1990) (indicating that a remitter is not a holder).
"See id. § 3-102 cmt. 1 (1989). The comment states:
[The N.I.L.1 required that the delivery be "to a person who takes as a holder," thus
raising difficulties in the case of the remitter ... who may not be a party to the
instrument and thus not a holder. The definition in subsection (I) (a) of the Section
thus provides that the delivery may be to a holder or to a retainer.
Id.
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enacted in all fifty states. 4° Comment 2 to section 3-302 uses remitters
in two examples showing how the payee of an instrument can become
a holder in due course." These examples differ little from the one,
described below, in official comment 4 to the revised section 3-302. 42
2. The Revised Article 3
The American Law Institute and the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws approved a major revision of article
3 in 1990." As of the time of this writing, thirty-one states and the
District of Columbia have adopted this revision." Presently, all other
jurisdictions retain the pre-revision version of the article on their
books.
The 1990 version of article 3 addresses remitters in three sections.
The first of these sections, section 3-103, defines various terms, includ-
ing "remitter," used throughout the article." Section 3-201, the second
section mentioning remitters, describes the "negotiation" of instru-
ments, a form of assignment.A 1' Section 3-201(b) says that a bearer
instrument—such as a check payable to cash—"may be negotiated by
transfer of possession alone."" Section 3-201(b) also states that
"[e]xcept for negotiation by a remitter," negotiation of a nonbearer
instrument requires a proper indorsement." Section 3-201(b), in
other words, indicates that remitters can negotiate even nonbearer
instruments without indorsement. Thus, if a consumer buys a cashier's
check payable to a merchant, the consumer can negotiate it simply by
delivering it to the merchant. The consumer does not need to sign the
check.
Section 3-312, the third section in the revised version of article 3
that discusses remitters, establishes a new procedure for recovering the
amount of lost, destroyed, or stolen cashier's checks, teller's checks, or
40 See id. § 3-101 cmt. (1989) (discussing the N.I.L.); JAMS J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM Commuuffid. CODE § I, at 2-3 (3d ed. 1988) (student edition) (same).
41 See U.C.C. § 3-302 cmt. 2 (1989).
42 See id. § 3-302 cmt. 4 (1990).
42
 See BAILEY, supra note 34, 1 1.8, as 1-11, 1-12.
44 1d. 1 1.8, at S1-4, 5I-5 (Snpp. 1994). Some of these jurisdictions have made minor changes
to the official text. Id.
45 See. U.C.C. § 3-103 (1990).
46 Id. § 3-201. For more details on assignment, see infra Part IV.E.
42 U.C.C. § 3-201 (a); see id § 3-111.
42 1d. § 3-201(b).
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certified checks." The procedure requires a party who loses one of
these instruments to file a "declaration of loss" with the issuing bank
and to assume any liability that the bank might have on the instru-
ment." Sections 3-312(a) (3) (ii) and 3-312(b)(i) include the "remit-
ter" as one of the parties eligible to use the procedure; both sections
state that, in the case of a cashier's check or teller's check, the person
claiming the right to recover must be the remitter or payee of the
check."
In addition to these three sections, six official comments to the
current version of article 3 also mention remitters." Of the six, only
two are important because they take controversial stances on issues that
the text does not address clearly. 5° Comment 4 to section 3-302 explic-
itly distinguishes remitters from holders." Additionally, comment 1 to
section 3-312 asserts that remitters do not have the right to enforce
instruments."
49 See id. § 3-312(b). This provision did not exist in earlier versions of article 3.
"See id. § 3-312(b)—(c). For more details on the procedure, see infra Parts IVA.1.c, IV.G.
51 See U.C.C. §§ 3-312 (a) (3) (ii), (b) (1).
"Four of these comments provide little new information about the rights or liabilities of
remitters. Comment 1 to § 3-105 notes that the pre-revision article 3 did not define remitters.
See id. § 3-105 ant. 1. The comment says in pertinent part: "Under former Section 3-102(1) (a)
'issue' was defined as the first delivery to a 'holder or a remitter' but the term 'remitter' was
neither defined nor otherwise used." Id. Comment 2 to § 3-201 gives an example of how a
remitter may negotiate an instrument. See id. § 3-201 cmt. 2. In the example, Buyer purchases
goods from Seller with a cashier's check payable to Seller. The comment states in pertinent part:
"In that case Buyer is referred to as the 'remitter.' Section 3-103(a)(1 I). The remitter, although
not a party to the check, is the owner of the check until ownership is transferred to Seller by
delivery." Id. Comment 2 to § 3-312 reiterates that only remitters and a few other parties may
use the procedure established by § 3-312. See id. § 3-312 cmt. 2. It states in pertinent part: "[A]
claim may be asserted only by the drawer or payee of a certified check or the remitter or payee
of a cashier's check or teller's check. An indorsee of a check is not covered because the indorsee
is not an original party to the check or a remitter." Id. Comment 3 to § 3-411 states that banks
sometimes refuse to pay cashier's checks and teller's checks on grounds that a remitter has a
claim to them. See id. § 3-411 cmt. 3. The comment explains: "In the usual case [when a bank
refuses to pay a cashier's check or teller's check] ... a remitter ... is asserting a claim to the
check on the basis of a rescission of negotiation to the payee under Section 3-202." Id. Section
3-202 allows rescission for fraud and other grounds. See id. § 3-202(b).
"For a discussion of the controversy, see infra Part IV.A.2.
" See U.C.C. § 3-302 cmt. 4. The comment presents an example in which Buyer obtained a
cashier's check from Bank and then delivered it to Seller. The comment states in pertinent part:
In that case, when Buyer took delivery of the check from Bank, Buyer became the
owner of the check even though Buyer was not the holder. Buyer was a remitter.
Section 3-103(a) (11). At that point, nobody was a holder. When Buyer delivered
the check to Seller, ownership of the check was transferred to Seller who also
became the holder.
Id.
" See id. § 3-312 cmt. I. The comment notes that section 3-312 differs from section 3-309,
a similar provision that allows holders and certain others to enforce instruments that they have
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B. Cases
A wide variety of cases have addressed the rights and liabilities of
remitters. These cases fall into two relevant categories. The first cate-
gory includes common law and other cases decided prior to enactment
of the Code. The second category includes all cases decided by courts
after adoption in their jurisdictions of article 3 of the Code.
1. Earlier Cases
Although not extensive, a law of remitters existed prior to the
promulgation of the Code. Cases in England began to discuss remitters
in the seventeenth century when bills of exchange had become a
common form of negotiable instrument." By the late nineteenth cen-
tury, courts in the United States also had rendered a variety of deci-
sions on remitters.57 Some of these decisions, as Part III will show,
remain highly influential.
States codified the law of negotiable instruments around the turn
of the century. As noted above, between 1896 and promulgation of the
Code in the 1950s, every state adopted the N.I.L." The N.I.L., however,
did not mention remitters and thus did little to delineate their rights
and liabilities." As a result, even after the N.I.L.'s enactment, courts
had to determine the rights of remitters by analogy to other parties
whose rights the law defined and by reference to pre-N.I.L. case law."
Because cases rendered during this period thus do not depend on the
N.I.L., courts should treat them like common law precedent.
2. Cases Under the Code
Courts have issued scores of reported opinions on remitters under
the Code. Parts IV and V of this essay address several dozen of these
lost. In explaining one difference, the comment states in pertinent part: "Section 3-309 applies
only to a person entitled to enforce the check. It does not apply to a remitter of a cashier's check
or teller's check or to the drawer of a certified check. Section 3-312 applies to both." Id.
"For a thorough discussion of the early history of the common law of remitters, see
Frederick K. Beutel, Rights of Remitters and Other Owners Not Within the Tenor of Negotiable
Instruments, 12 MINN. L. REV. 584, 591 -98 (1928).
57 See id.
58 See supra text accompanying note 40.
55 See Underhill Moore, Note, The Right of the Remitter of a Bill or Note, 20 CoLum. L. REV.
749, 754 (1920).
611 See WILLIAM E. Blurrox, B1LLs mu) NOTES 300 (1943); Moore, supra note 59, at 754,
755-56.
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cases. For now, several generalizations about these decisions must
suffice.
First, most courts have found determining the rights and liabilities
of remitters under the Code rather difficult. Because the Code says so
little about remitters, the courts simply have not had much guidance.
As a result, many opinions rely on precedent rather than on statutory
provisions." Part III will explain the legitimacy of this approach.
Second, courts have disagreed on a variety of issues that they have
addressed. For example, as Part IV will show, courts currently disagree
about the basis for allowing remitters to return instruments and about
whether remitters may recover for wrongful payment! Fortunately,
because many cases only have reached intermediate courts, the
conflicts have not become permanent." At this point, the courts of last
resort in most states still have the power to undo the disagreements.
Third, despite widespread litigation of questions involving remit-
ters, courts still have not addressed a number of significant issues. For
example, no court appears to have considered the fundamental issue
of whether remitters make presentment or transfer warranties.m Even-
tually, however, these issues may find their way into litigation.
Fourth, nearly all modern remitter cases involve cashier's checks.
Nothing in article 3 precludes a person from becoming a remitter of
other kinds of instruments." Yet, only a few cases have concerned
teller's checks and money orders," and no case has addressed personal
checks." Perhaps litigation over cashier's checks predominates because
they typically involve larger sums of money. Whatever the reason,
61 For examples, see supra note 32.
62 See infra Parts IV.A, IV.C.
°A few cases have reached state courts of last resort. See, e.g., State ex rel. Chan Slew Lai v.
Powell, 536 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Mo. 1976) (en bane) (remitter could not enjoin bank's payment of a
cashier's check to the holder); Runge Corp. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 286 N.E.2d 903,
906 (N.Y. 1972) (absent notice of delivery, bank could accept return of cashier's check by
remitter); Mesquite State Bank v. Professional Inv. Corp., 488 S.W.2d 73, 75 (Tex. 1972) (bank
liable to remitter to whom it failed to issue cashier's checks).
64 See infra Part IV.
65 5ee 	 3-10300(11) (1990) (allowing remitters to purchase any kind or instrumen
66 For remitter cases involving teller's checks, see, e.g., Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Delco Corp., 195
S.E.2d 455,457 (Ga. Gt. App. 1973); Feinstein v. Chemical Bank, 443 N.Y.S.2d 356,357 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1981); Fur Fantastic, Ltd. v. Kearns, 430 N.Y.S.2d 27,29 (Civ. Ct. 1980); Steenbergen v. First
Fed. Say. & Loan, 753 P.2d 1330, 1331 (Okla. App. 1987). For cases on money orders, see, e.g.,
First Nat'l Bank v. Duncan Say. & Loan Ass'n, 957 F.2d. 775 (10th Cir. 1992); Chicago Cicero
Currency Exch., Inc. v. Continental III. Nat'l Bank, 545 N.E.2d 259 (III. App. Ct. 1989); Duggan
v. State Bank of Antioch, 540 N.E.2d 1111(111. App. Ct. 1989).
°Americans apparently never have purchased personal checks for remittance. See Moore,
supra note 59, at 759.
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because of the disparity in the number of cases, this essay inevitably
will discuss cashier's checks more than it discusses other instruments.
C. Secondary Sources
Britton's classic treatise on Bills and Notes, which appeared before
the Code, contains a very helpful section on remitters at common law
and under the N.I.L."' No major treatise on the Uniform Commercial
Code, however, attempts to address remitters in a comprehensive man-
ner. The most extensive coverage appears in the Uniform Commercial
Code Series, a multi-volume work written by Hawkland and others .° It
mentions remitters in over thirty places. Part IV discusses some of the
authors' ideas in depth. Other modern treatises say almost nothing
about remitters.'"
Most scholarship about remitters in law reviews predates the Code.
In the 1920s, both the Columbia Law Review and Minnesota Law Review
published thorough articles on the common law status of remitters."'
A few other articles and notes from roughly the same period also
discussed remitters."
Since adoption of the Code, one brief but thoughtful student note
has focused on the rights of remitters." A number of other articles
have addressed remitters incidentally in discussing cashier's checks and
similar instruments."' None of these writings, however, has attempted
to provide a complete account of the rights and liabilities of remitters.
68 See Morro/4, supra note 60, at 298-303.
69 HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note I.
"The multi-volume treatise on the Uniform Commercial Code by Anderson addresses their
rights briefly in one section. See 5A RONALD A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL Cone § 3-104:51 (1994). Bailey's leading treatise on bank checks mentions remitters in
a few places, but the treatment is not consistent. See BAILEY Kr AL., supra note 34. The Treatise,
for example, states that "[t]he term 'remitter' is not defined in the 1962 or 1990 UCC." Id. 5.1,
at 5-2 n.2. In fact, as noted above, U.C.C. § 3-103(a) (11) (1990) supplies a definition. White and
Summers' four-volume work on the Code appears not to mention remitters, See I Bkoms J. WHITE
AND ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE (1993) (practitioner edition).
71 See Beutel, supra note 56; Moore, supra note 59.
79
 See Zechariah Chafee, Progress of the Law—Bills and Notes, 33 HARV. L. REV. 255, 263-64
(1919); Cancellation of Bank Draft at Request of Purchaser, 40 BANKING U. 527 (1923); Case
Comment, Sutherland State Bank v. Dial, 28 YALE U. 695 (1919) [hereinfter Case Comment];
Comment, Transmission of Money and Sale of Credit, 33 YALE U. 177 (1923) [hereinafter Yale
Comment].
73 See Jane E. Tobin, Comment, The Rights of a Remitter of a Negotiable Instrument, 8 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. LIZEV. 260 (1967).
74 See David J. Benson, Stop Payment of Cashier's Checks and Bank Drafts Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 2 Onto N.U. L. REV. 445 (1975); Brian J. Davis, The Future of Cashier's Checks
under Revised Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 613 (1992);
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III. DECIDING QUESTIONS ABOUT REMITTERS
The following discussion outlines and defends a brief theory of
how courts should decide questions about remitters. It asserts that
courts must follow the Code where it speaks to an issue. Where the
Code does not answer a question, however, courts must resort to
common law principles. Sometimes precedent will govern an issue that
the Code does not. When courts have discretion to shape the common
law, however, they should avoid creating new rights and liabilities for
remitters except in limited circumstances.
A. Questions Answered by the Code
Writers have expressed divergent views about how courts should
interpret the Code?' No one, however, could disagree with at least one
fundamental point: article 3 is a statute—a law passed by legislatures—
and not simply a set of recommendations. 76 Courts, as a result, cannot
ignore or disobey the Code when it addresses an issue. To the extent
that the article grants rights to remitters, courts must recognize these
rights. Likewise, to the extent that it imposes liabilities on remitters,
courts must recognize these liabilities.
Some provisions in article 3 expressly concern remitters. For ex-
ample, as noted in Part II above, section 3-201(b) states that remitters
do not have to indorse instruments to negotiate them." Courts must
follow this provision when confronting questions about a negotiation,
regardless of pre-Code precedent or contrary policy arguments.
Other provisions in article 3 do not mention remitters but, by the
generality of their scope, include remitters in their coverage. Section
3-202(b), for example, states that, in certain circumstances, a "nego-
tiation may be rescinded."79 The section does not limit the parties that
Francine H. Fox, Stopping Payment on a Cashier's Check, 19 B.C. L. REV. 683 (1978); Lary
Lawrence, Making Cashier's Checks and Other Bank Checks Cost-Effective: A Plea for Revision of
Ankles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 MINN. L. REV. 275 (1980); John M. Norwood,
Cashier's Checks and the Bank's Right to Deny Payment, 108 BANKING U. 476 (1991); George
Wallach, Negotiable Instruments: The Bank Customer's Ability to Prevent Payment on Various Forms
of Checks, 11 18n. L. REV. 579, 592 (1978); Note, Blocking Payment on a Certified, Cashier's, or
Bank Check, 73 MICH. L. Rev. 424 (1974) [hereinafter Michigan Note); Columbia Note, supra
note 12.
75 See, e.g, WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 60, § 4, at 9-10; William D. Hawkland, Uniform
Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 291; Julian 13. McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation
of the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Implications forjurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. Rev. 795 (1978).
76 See U.C.C. § 3-102 (1990) (defining the scope of the article).
77 See id. § 3-201(b).
78 1d. § 3-202(b).
July 1995]
	
RIGHTS OF THE REMITTER 	 633
may exercise the right to rescind. As a result, courts should allow
remitters to rescind to the same extent that they would allow any other
party who has negotiated an instrument to rescind."
Provisions of general applicability, like section 3-202(b), have
great importance. Even though only a few sections of article 3 refer to
remitters in express terms, a great variety bear on their rights and
liabilities. Parts IV and V attempt to identify these sections and explain
their application.
B. Questions Answered by Precedent
Although article 3 answers some questions about remitters, either
through sections specifically addressed to them or through sections of
general applicability, it does not answer all questions. For example,
several cases have confronted the issue of whether a remitter who
purchases a cashier's check from a bank has a right to return the check
for a refund." Nothing in article 3 says whether remitters have such a
righ tat
A court confronted with this issue might be tempted to conclude
that the statute's silence itself resolves the issue. In particular, it might
take the position that remitters have only the rights and liabilities that
the Code establishes and no others. Because article 3 does not mention
a right to obtain a refund, a remitter could not possibly have such a
right.
In many areas of the law, courts should follow this approach.
Certainly, courts should not find that debtors in bankruptcy have a
right to keep more property than the applicable exemption statutes
permit them." Likewise, courts should not hold that individuals have
a duty to pay federal taxes on any forms of income other than those
specified in the Internal Revenue Code."
The Uniform Commercial Code, however, differs from many
other statutes in that it does not strive to set forth a complete statement
of the law. Section 1-103 states: "Unless displaced by the particular
provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity, including the
28 See id. § 3-411 cmi 3 (discussing an example in which a remitter might rescind a nego-
tiation).
8() See, e.g., Saloga v. Central Kan. credit Union, 783 P.2d 339, 343 (Kan. 1989) (refund
allowed); Gillespie v. Riley Management Corp., 319 N.E.2d 753, 758 (Ill. 1974) (same); Bunge
Corp. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 286 N.E.2d 903, 906 (N.Y. 1972) (same).
8I See supra Part II.
82 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988) (identifying exemptions allowed to debtors in bankruptcy).
83 See 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (1990) (defining income).
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law merchant and [other laws] . . . shall supplement its provisions.""
In other words, although the Code assigns certain rights and liabilities
to parties to commercial transactions, the parties often may have others
under different statutes or the common law. Whether they do or not
depends on the particular portions of the Code at issue.8°
Courts should conclude that article 3 displaces very little non-
Code law on remitters. By mentioning remitters in several places, the
Code contemplates that remitters will participate in some transactions
involving negotiable instruments. Yet, article 3 simply does not say
enough about remitters to permit courts to decide many questions."
As the epigraph at the start of this essay states, "the rights of remitters
are the rights that the Code forgot."87 By its near silence on the subject
of remitters, therefore, the Code appears to invite courts to look to
other sources to determine remitters' rights and liabilities." Earlier
commentators similarly asserted that courts should supplement the
N.I.L. by looking to common law cases on remitters.99
As a result, when the Code does not address an issue, but common
law precedent does, courts should follow the precedent. For example,
in the 1974 case of Gillespie v. Riley Management Col., the Illinois
Supreme Court confronted the issue of whether a remitter has a right
to return a cashier's check for a refund.9° The court based its conclu-
sion that the remitter had such a right, not on article 3, but instead
84 U.C.C. § 1-103 (1990).
85 See WIIITF: & SUMMERS, supra note 40, § 5, at 19-20; ANDERSON, Sir, note 70, § 1-103:8,
at 75.
86 See supra Part II.
87 See HAWKIAND El' AL., supra note 1, § 4-104:03.
88 See id. § 1-103:02 ("[T] here are some commercial law situations for which the UCC
intentionally provides no answer, and in these cases the courts quickly resort to common law for
solution or supplementation:).
One influential commentator has cautioned against overusing § 1-103, suggesting that
courts in most cases should stick to the express language of the Code. See Robert A. Hillman,
Construction of the Uniform Commercial Code: UCC Section 1 -103 and "Code" Methodology, 18 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. Rev. 655, 684-85 (1977). Yet, even he agrees that when "both express Code
language and Code purposes and policies are hopelessly unclear or contradictory ... resort to
common law is justified." Id. at 695. The treatment of remitters in the Code appears to meet this
high standard. For more on the issue of displacement of other law under § 1-103, see generally
ROBERT A. HILLMAN Er AL., COMMON LAW AND Equrrv UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
(1985).
86 See Moore, supra note 59, at 754 ("Mhe framework and structure of [the NIL.] . . .
provide no place for the treatment of the payee's claim .... It is casus omissus. So also, of course,
is the claim of the remitter or other third person, which it is judged therefore will be granted or
denied on the same terms as before the statutes:), see also Barrrou, supra note 60, at 300
(recommending that courts determine the rights of a remitter by analogy of a remitter to a mere
transferee and by looking at pre-NIL. case law).
93319 N.E.2c1 753, 754 (III. 1974).
July 1995] 	 RIGHTS OF THE REMITTER	 635
on an 1889 common law precedent."' Section 1-103 mandates this
approach.
C. Unsettled Questions
Unfortunately, in many instances, neither the Code nor any com-
mon law precedent will answer a question about remitters. As described
in Part II, although cases on remitters date to the seventeenth century,
the common law has never fully addressed remitters. Consequently,
many technical issues about remitters remain open.
Generally speaking, courts have no choice but to answer unsettled
questions about the rights and liabilities of remitters by creating new
rules as a matter of common law. Section 1-103 tells courts to look to
supplementary general principles. If no such principles exist on a
point, courts must improvise them."'
When courts make a new common law rule to govern remitter
transactions, they have considerable discretion to determine the rule's
content. In exercising this discretion, courts should take policy consid-
erations into account to ensure that they fashion appropriate stand-
ards. By contrast, as noted above, when courts merely are following
statutes or precedent, policy considerations are not as important.
Courts typically confront policy issues from two different perspec-
tives: the "ex ante" and the "ex post.'" The ex ante perspective focuses
on how rules will shape behavior in the future. The ex post perspective
concerns the fairness of rules as applied to particular situations after
they have occurred. Each perspective suggests that courts generally
should refuse to create new common law rights or liabilities for remit-
ters. In exceptional cases, however, courts may develop new rights and
liabilities that will prevent unexpected forfeitures.
I. Ex Ante Perspective
Legal rules can change behavior. Any new common law that courts
create with respect to remitters, as a result, may affect the willingness
of parties to enter into remitter transactions. New rules that give
remitters additional rights may cause more parties to want to become
91 See id. at 757 (citing Buehler v. Galt, 35 III. App. 225, 227 (1889)).
92 See, e.g., Girard Bank v. Mount Holly State Bank, 474 F. Supp. 1225, 1239 (D.N. J. 1979)
(noting that courts may improvise new common law rights to supplement the Code). But
HAWKLAND Er AL., supra note I, § 1-103:02 (observing that the absence of a well-defined
common law often persuades courts to stay within the Code).
n See generally Jason S. Johnston, Uncertainty, Chaos, and the Tins Process: An Economic
Analysis of Form, 76 CORNELL L. Rev. 341, 347 (1991); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court,
/983 Tenn—Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 Ilmtv. L. Rev. 4, 10-12 (1984).
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remitters. New rules that impose liabilities on remitters, by contrast,
may have the opposite effect.
From an ex ante perspective, the policy issue involved in deciding
unsettled questions about the rights and liabilities of remitters is
whether courts should encourage or discourage remitter transactions.
They should do neither. Courts should maintain the status quo by
generally refusing to create new rights or liabilities for remitters.
a. Encouraging Remitter Transactions
The current use of remitter transactions discussed in Part I sug-
gests little reason for attempting to encourage them by granting new
rights to remitters in addition to those already established by the Code
and precedent. Parties who currently are not using remitter transac-
tions as a means of making payments most likely are using an alterna-
tive. Some may be paying with credit cards, personal checks or other
payment devices. Others may be buying cashier's checks or teller's
checks, but completing them in ways such that they do not become
remitters.
If courts create common law rules that make remitter transactions
more attractive, some parties may give up alternatives and decide to
become remitters. But few parties will enter transactions that they
would not have entered anyway. As a result, granting new common law
rights to encourage remitter transactions would not enhance economic
efficiency.
Efforts to encourage remitter transactions, if taken to extremes,
also might conflict with the structure of the Code. The Code envisions
that most negotiable instruments transactions will not involve remit-
ters. Article 3, as noted above, carefully specifies the rights and liabili-
ties of all parties to transactions except remitters. Remitters do not
receive equal attention because the Code expects that remitter trans-
actions will occur less frequently than other transactions.
By exerting efforts to encourage remitter transactions to a sig-
nificant extent, courts would be trying to make a silk purse from a
sow's ear. They would be attempting to transform remitter transactions
into something more significant than the Code contemplates. To com-
port with the structure of the Code, therefore, courts should leave the
rights of remitters as they stand.
b. Discouraging Remitter Transactions
Any effort to reduce the number of remitter transactions by im-
posing additional liabilities on remitters might cause two problems.
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First, the effort might harm people who currently have no alternative
ways of conducting their business. For example, as described in Part I,
many consumers become remitters when they have no other feasible
way to make payments.
Consumers sometimes have to buy checks from banks either be-
cause they do not have their own checking accounts or because the
persons receiving payment refuse to take personal checks. Having
purchased the instruments, they must become remitters because the
persons receiving payment do not trust other arrangements. Imposing
additional liabilities on these parties may prevent them from entering
into transactions altogether.
Second, efforts to discourage remitter transactions, if taken to
extremes, would conflict with the structure of the Code. Although
article 3 does not contemplate many negotiable instrument transac-
tions involving remitters, it does envision at least some remitter trans-
actions. The Code, as noted, defines the term remitter and describes
various aspects of remitter transactions." Courts should not use their
common law powers to thwart this vision by imposing liabilities that
effectively would stamp out remitter transactions.
New common law rules imposing additional liabilities on remitters
might have one benefit. As noted in Part I above, criminals often use
remitter transactions for illegitimate purposes. Increasing the liabilities
that remitters face may make some criminals less eager to become
remitters.
This benefit, however, probably does not justify the costs described
above. If criminal usage presents a problem, the law should focus on
ways of eliminating it. The Treasury regulations discussed in Part 1.13
provide a good example. The law should not attempt to strike at all
remitter transactions, whether legitimate or not.
2. Ex Post Perspective
The ex post perspective concerns a different question. The issue
is not whether courts must create rules to encourage or discourage
remitter transactions. Instead, the issue is whether courts need to
create new rights or liabilities to ensure that participants in remitter
transactions receive fair treatment.
Courts generally need not create new rights or new liabilities to
protect the participants in remitter transactions. Instead, courts usually
should presume that the existing rules under the Code and precedent
treat fairly both remitters and the people with whom they deal. After
94 See supra Part qLA.
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all, if the existing rules did not treat the parties fairly, the parties most
likely would not have entered into the transaction in the first place.
Any attempt to alter the rules after the parties have made a transaction
would be of' questionable benefit.
The discussion in Part I above, however, suggests one possible
problem with assuming that the current statutory rules and precedent
have always treated the parties to remitter transactions fairly. Some
parties to remitter transactions do not know the exact status of the law.
For example, people who buy negotiable instruments may not know
whether they have the right, under article 3 or applicable case law, to
enforce them or transfer them. Similarly, parties who take instruments
from remitters may not know what rights they have against remitters if
something goes wrong.
This observation suggests that, in certain circumstances, courts
may have to create new rules to protect remitters and the people with
whom they deal. Because of uncertainty in the law, parties under-
standably may believe that they have protections that, in fact, do not
exist. Courts, however, must keep their lawmaking to a minimum to
avoid substantial changes in the status quo.
To ensure fairness, courts should create rights for remitters that
will prevent them from suffering unexpected forfeitures. As Part IV
below indicates, however, the occasions for creating new rights are very
few. The existing rules, although not always clear, generally treat re-
mitters fairly.
Courts similarly should feel free to impose new liabilities on re-
mitters to protect the parties with whom they deal. Yet, to conserve the
status quo and ensure compatibility with the Code, courts should
model these liabilities after those imposed on other parties under
article 3. As discussed in Part V, courts should rarely exercise this
power.
IV. THE RIGHTS OF REMITTERs
Typically, remitters negotiate their instruments to the named pay-
ees. The payees later present the instruments to their issuers. The
issuers then pay without objection. The result satisfies everyone in-
volved. Most remitter transactions, accordingly, do not end up in liti-
gation.
In a significant number of cases, however, something goes wrong.
For example, the parties involved in a remitter transaction may dispute
who owns an instrument at a particular point, or who has the power
July 19951
	
RIGHTS OF THE REMITTER 	 639
to enforce it. To resolve such disputes, courts must determine the
rights of the various parties.
When a remitter claims a particular right with respect to an in-
strument, courts should subject the claim to the analysis suggested in
Part III. They should recognize any rights that the text of article 3
expressly or implicitly grants to remitters. Yet, they generally should
refuse to create new common law rights to supplement those in the
Code.
The following discussion evaluates various rights that remitters
have claimed in actual cases or that they likely will assert in future
disputes. It analyzes the issues primarily under the revised version of
article 3, but addresses the application of the pre-revision version
where it differs significantly.
A. Right to Obtain a Refund or Right to Enforce
A remitter may decide not to negotiate an instrument after pur-
chasing it. For example, a consumer who procures a cashier's check
or teller's check to use for a down payment on a house might decide
not to buy the house after all. The remitter thus will not wish to tender
the check to the payee. Instead, the remitter likely will want to return
the check to bank.
Many banks, as a matter of business practice, allow remitters to
return cashier's checks and teller's checks if they decide not to nego-
tiate them to the payee."' In some instances, however, banks and other
sellers of instruments may refuse to refund the purchase price. They
may worry that the remitter has engaged in some inappropriate con-
duct, or they simply may not want to pay anything that they do not
have a duty to pay.'"
No question has created more controversy in discussions about
remitters than what rights the remitter has against the issuer if the
issuer will not voluntarily take back an instrument. The debate has
focused on two potential rights. One is a right to rescind the purchase
of the check and to obtain a refund of the price from the bank. The
other is a right to enforce the instrument, making the bank pay its face
amount. Commentators long have disagreed about which, if either, of
these rights the remitter has.
95 See Tobin, supra note 73, at 263, ("[T] he remitter may choose not to transmit la cashier's
check or teller's check] to the payee and, under general banking practice, he will be able to
recover from the obligor.").
9° See, e.g., Sutherland State Bank v. Dial, 170 N.W. 666,667-68 (Neb. 1919) (issuer refused
to refund money to remitter without stating any good reason).
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Prior to promulgation of the Code, early writers took every con-
ceivable position on the issue. Some asserted that remitters had a legal
right to enforce the instrument against the bank, but did not have the
equitable right to rescind its purchase. As one author in 1920 passion-
ately wrote:
Is not the remitter's claim equitable? No, his remedy is as-
sumpsit. Surely equitable in origin? There is no hint of it in
the books. Is it not merely a quasi-contractual claim for resti-
tution of the consideration? No. It is for the payment of face
of the instrument at the time and place of payment; the
action is assumpsit on the instrument."
Other leading scholars shared this view."
Many writers of the period, however, disagreed. Some concluded
that remitters have an equitable right to obtain a refund, but do not a
have right to enforce." Still others thought that remitters had both
rights.'°° One superb unsigned student case comment asserted that
remitters technically have neither a right to enforce nor a right to
recover, but ought to recover nonetheless.'°'
The debate has continued under the Code because nothing in
article 3 expressly addresses either right. Most cases and commentators
now seem to agree that remitters have the right to obtain a refund—at
least in certain circumstances. 1 °2 These sources, however, disagree on
97 Moore, supra note 59, at 753.
98 See, e.g., BRITTON, supra note 60, at 300-01 ("DM here the purchasing remitter has decided
not to tender the instrument to the payee, the remitter ... has a right to recover from the maker
or the drawer by an action on the instrument . . . .").
" See, e.g., Chafee, supra note 72, at 263-64 (arguing that the remitter's recovery is for money
had and received).
Im See Beutel, supra note 56, at 589 (recognizing that "there is a wide diversity of opinion"
about the nature of the remitters rights against the principal obligor); Yale Comment, supra note
72, at 180-81 (noting the disagreement in theories).
Ital The case comment appeared in the Yale Law journal in 1919, the year Karl Llewellyn
served as Editor in Chief. See 28 YALE L.J. 673 (masthead). The comment explains that a remitter
cannot enforce an instrument because the remitter is not named on it and has not received it
from the payee through a transfer. See Case Comment, supra note 72. at 696. It asserts that a
remitter also has no equitable rights absent mistake or inadvertence. See id. Yet, in approving
recovery in a particular case, the comment states: "Something had to be done; the mores decidedly
called for action in some form.... Whatever the technical justification of allowing recovery, .. .
it is believed that the principal case is one of those in which the court should indeed du justice,
but must to do justice create new law." /d. at 696-97.
1 °2 See, e.g., Whinnery v. Citizens Nat'l Bank (In re Northwest Liquor Indus.), 107 B.R. 616,
620 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1988); Burke v. Mission Bay Yacht Sales, 29 Cal. Rptr. 685, 688 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1963); Parker v. Dudley, 527 So. 2d 240, 243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Gillespie v. Riley
Management Corp., 319 N.E.2d 753, 758 (Ill. 1974); Saloga v. Central Kan. Credit Union, 783
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the theory of recovery. Some root it in grounds of equity; 1 " others, in
implied contract;'" still others offer no clear explanation.'"
Courts and commentators disagree fundamentally about whether
remitters have a right to enforce an instrument under the Code. On
the one hand, as noted in Part II, an official comment to article 3 takes
the position that remitters do not have the right to enforce. In part of
a larger passage, the comment explains that the "remitter of a cashier's
check or teller's check" cannot use a certain procedure because the
procedure "applies only to a person entitled to enforce the check."'"
One recent case, discussed below, shares this view. 107
On the other hand, some scholars take the stance that remitters
have the right to enforce an instrument. In the multi-volume treatise
by Hawkland and others, the authors state that "it is not at all clear
that a remitter may not sue on the instrument itself."'" They then
present several tentative arguments for concluding that remitters do
have such a right, although they consider the issue difficult.'"
It is important to determine whether a remitter has a right to
obtain a refund or a right to enforce. The two rights certainly resemble
each other; both rights, if available, would allow remitters to recover
P.2d 339, 343 (Kan. 1989); !lunge Corp. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 286 N.E.2d 903,
906 (N.Y. 1972); 5A ANDERSON, SUPER note 70, § 3-104:51, at 51 ("[A] cashier's check , may
be returned by the purchaser to the issuing bank for cancellation."); BAILEY El . AL., supra note
34,1 1.17, at 1-25 ("Prior to valid delivery, the purchaser of a cashier's check may cause it to be
canceled."); 58 MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING § 251, at 7-8 (1991) ("[U]ntil ... delivery, the
purchaser retains a right to cancel.").
1 °3 See, e.g., Gillespie, 319 N.E.2d at 758 (noting necessity of rule to prevent injustice).
101 See, e.g., Burke, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 688 ("[T]he drawer-drawee of a cashier's check, viz., the
bank, impliedly authorizes the person ordering, paying for, and receiving possession of the same,
to deliver or withhold delivery thereof to the payee therein named."); BAILEY Er AL., supra note
34,1 1.17, at 1-24, 1-25 ("A bank that issues a cashier's check impliedly authorizes the purchaser
thereof to deliver or to withhold delivery of the check to the payee of check.").
106 See, e.g., Whinnery, 107 B.R. at 620; Saloga, 783 P.2d at 343; Parker, 527 So. 2d at 243;
lunge, 286 N.E.2d at 906; 5A ANDERSON, supra note 70, § 3-104:51, at 51; 58 MICHIE ON BANKS
AND BANKING, supra note 104, § 251, at 7-8.
1 °6 See U .C.C. § 3-312 ant, 1 (1990) (explaining how remitters cannot use the procedure for
recovering lost instruments in § 3-309).
1°7 See Michaud v. Community Say. Bank, No. CV 92-05160245, 1994 WL 146371, at *2 (Cone.
Super. Ct. Apr. 8, 1994) (noting that a person can "have no right to enforce Ian] instrument as
the remitter").
1 °8 HAWKIAND El' AL., SUPER note 1, § 3-419:04.
m See id. The authors worry that recognizing the right to enforce or the right to obtain a
refund comes at a cost. In particular, it reduces "the protection that the payee has in receiving a
check, namely that unless he indorses the check it cannot be cashed." See id. § 3-102:05. For
further discussion of the issue whether a remitter can enforce, see id. §§ 3-419:04, 3-603:04,
4-104:03.
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from an issuer. Yet, the characterization of the right may matter for
four reasons.
First, the characterization may make a difference in a variety of
contexts in addition to when a remitter declines to negotiate an instru-
ment. Many provisions of the Code turn on a whether a person has a
right to enforce an instrument. For example, every time a person
transfers an instrument for consideration, the person warrants that he
or she has the right to enforce."' As discussed further below, if remit-
ters have only a right to obtain a refund, they would breach this
warranty whenever they use instruments to make payments."
Second, the two rights sometimes may involve different amounts
of money. A person seeking to enforce an instrument against a person
claims that the person must pay the face (stated) value of the instru-
ment. This amount may exceed the purchase price of the instru-
ment." For example, suppose a remitter buys a note having a $100
face value at a discount for $90. If the remitter wants to rescind the
purchase and obtain a refund, the issuer would have to pay $90. By
contrast, if the remitter could enforce the note, the remitter could
recover the full $100 face value.
Third, the right to enforce an instrument might increase the
number of persons against whom the remitter would have a claim. If
a remitter has only a right to obtain a refund, the remitter may only
recover from the issuer—the person that the remitter paid. But if the
remitter can enforce the instrument, the remitter could recover from
co-makers and accommodation parties, even though they did not ac-
tually receive any money from the remitter."3
Fourth, the time available for exercising the two rights may differ.
Article 3 generally establishes long periods of limitations for enforcing
negotiable instruments."' For example, the period for enforcing cash-
ier's checks lasts for three years after the date of dishonor or ten years
after the check's date."5By contrast, because some courts may consider
the right to obtain a refund an equitable right, ladies might bar a
remitter from exercising the right at a much earlier time.
Given these four distinctions, courts must pay careful attention to
the rights claimed by remitters. For the reasons explained in the
''"See U.C.C. § 7-416(a) (1) (1990).
111 See infra Part IV.E.
"2 See Betitel, supra note 56, at 591 (discussing how the amount of restitution may differ
from the face amount of the instrument).
"3 See U .C.C. § 3-419 (1990) (discussing accommodation).
I" See id. § 3-118 (stating periods Ihr different kinds of instruments).
1151d. § 3-118(c).
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following sections, they should conclude that remitters have a right to
obtain a refund only in very limited circumstances. By contrast, how-
ever, courts should conclude that remitters always have a right to
enforce.
1. Right to Obtain a Refund
Article 3, as noted above, contains no provision expressly or im-
plicitly authorizing a remitter to rescind the purchase of an instrument
and obtain a refund."6 For the reasons stated in Part I above, courts
should not attempt to give remitters a new general common law or
equitable right to fill in this gap. Developing a new right would improve
the general condition of remitters. Accordingly, at least at the margins,
the new right might unnecessarily increase the number of remitter
transactions."7
Courts should award rescission of the purchase of an instrument
and a refund of the price only in three instances: (a) where the
remitter has a contractual right to a refund; (b) where the remitter
can show a traditional equitable basis for rescission; and (c) where the
remitter has lost an instrument and qualifies to use the special proce-
dure in revised section 3-312.
a. Contractual Right to Rescind
Even if article 3 does not grant a right to obtain a refund, a
remitter might have the right as a matter of contract. A contractual
right could arise in two ways. First, the remitter might enter an express
agreement with the bank. Many banks, for example, ask remitters to
sign a form contract when purchasing a cashier's check or teller's
check. If a form grants a remitter a right to obtain a refund, courts
should enforce the agreement just as they would enforce any agree-
ment.
Most remitters, however, will not have an express contractual right
to obtain a refund. The forms used by banks usually do little more than
explain the nature of the instrument being purchased and state the
charges that the bank will assess. For example, Citibank's form for
116 GI id. § 3-202 (authorizing rescission of a negotiation in certain circumstances).
II7How much a general right to obtain a refund would improve the position of remitters
depends on whether a court believes that remitters have a right to enforce an instrument. If
retnitters have the right to enforce, then the addition of a right to obtain a refund does not make
much difference. If they do not have a right to enforce, then a right to obtain a refund would
vastly improve their condition.
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applying for the purchase of cashier's checks does not cover the issue
of returns."'
Second, even without an express agreement, a remitter may have
an implied contractual right. Courts may infer that an implied contract
exists from evidence of the parties' expectations and understandings.
For instance, a bank implicitly might promise to refund the purchase
price of a check if, in the past, the bank regularly had refunded checks
that the customer purchased.
Some courts and commentators adopt the view that banks always
make an implied promise to take back an instrument, regardless of the
particular factual circumstances involved."9 Courts should reject this
view. Holding that issuers invariably make an implied contract to re-
fund would amount to granting remitters a new general right to re-
scind. As explained above, courts should avoid creating rights in this
manner.
b. Equitable Basis for Rescission
Some cases and other sources, as noted above, have argued that
courts should recognize a remitter's equitable right to return an in-
strument for a refund.m This view does not conflict with the policy
stated in Part III, provided that courts limit its application. In particu-
lar, courts should afford a remitter a right to rescind the purchase of
a cashier's check or other instrument only if the remitter can show a
traditional basis for rescission, such as mistake, misrepresentation, or
duress.'" Courts should not create new grounds justifying rescission
applicable only to remitters.
In most cases, the issuer of the instrument will not have engaged
in any conduct justifying rescission. The remitter will want to return
the instrument for a refund simply because the remitter decided not
to use it. By allowing a remitter to rescind in the absence of a tradi-
tional equitable ground, a court would be creating a new extra-statu-
tory right contrary to the policy favoring maintenance of the status
quo.
Some courts and commentators have asserted that justice may
require granting a remitter an equitable right to return an instrument,
112 See Citibank, Official Check and International Money Order Request (1995).
119 See supra note 104,
12° See supra note 103.
121 See RESTATEMF.NT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 151-177 (1988) (stating traditional rules
for rescission of contracts on these grounds).
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even if it means making new law. 122 Otherwise, they argue, the remitter
will end up with an instrument that the remitter does not want to use
and cannot return. This result would be unjust.
Courts may decide to accept this view, even if it means tampering
with the traditional rules of equity. As explained below, however, remit-
ters may have an alternative right that generally relieves these con-
cerns: the right to enforce an instrument.' 23 Courts that recognize a
right to enforce need not be concerned about unjustly denying a right
to obtain a refund.
c. Section 3-312
Under the revised version of article 3, remitters may recover from
a bank the amount of a cashier's check or teller's check that they have
lost. To exercise this right, as noted in Part II above, they must follow
the rules and procedures set forth in section 3-312. 124 In particular, the
remitter must declare under oath that he or she lost possession of the
instrumentm and then wait up to ninety days before payment.' 26
Courts should not construe section 3-312 as recognizing that
remitters have a general right to obtain a refund for two reasons. First,
the section does not help remitters who have possession of instru-
ments, but merely have decided not to use them. It applies only to
people whose instruments have been accidentally lost, stolen, or de-
stroyed. 127
Second, section 3-312 does not really create a right to a refund.
The amount of recovery under the provision equals the amount of the
instrument, not the amount paid for it. Moreover, unlike a true refund,
section 3-312 affords only conditional relief. Even if the bank does pay
the money to the remitter, the remitter later may have to turn it over
In See, e.g., Gillespie v. Riley Management Corp., 319 N.E.2d 753,757 (III. 1974) (explaining
that "ful mil the purchaser places such a check in the stream of commerce, he must, of practical,
commercial necessity, be able to cancel the check upon its surrender to the bank"); Case
Comment, supra note 72, at 697.
l"See infra Part IV.B.
In See U .C.C. § 3-312 (1990). The pre-revision version of the article does not contain a
comparable provision.
125 See id, § 3-312(b)(ii).
126 See id. § 3-312(b)(1).
127 A remitter presumably cannot come within § 3-312 by intentionally destroying an instru-
ment. Intentional destruction would amount to cancellation of the instrument and would dis-
charge the issuer. See id. § 3-604(a) (i).
646 	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 36:619
to someone one else claiming to have the right to enforce the lost
instrument. 128
2. Right to Enforce
A person who signs a negotiable instrument, such as an issuer,
drawer, or indorser, generally incurs a liability to pay its face amount.'29
The liability runs to those whom article 3 calls "persons entitled to
enforce" the instrument.'" The right to enforce an instrument is the
right to make the party who signed the instrument pay it.
Section 3-301 identifies the various parties who may enforce in-
struments. It states in part: "'Person entitled to enforce' an instrument
means (i) the holder of the instrument, (ii) a nonholder in possession
of the instrument who has the rights of a holder, or (iii) a person not
in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instru-
ment pursuant to Section 3-309 or 3-418(d)."3' Remitters do not
qualify as holders under subsection (i). Yet, courts should conclude
that remitters do meet the definition of nonholders in possession
under subsection (ii). They also may meet the definition of persons
covered by section 3-309 under subsection (iii).
a. Holders
The current definition of "holder" precludes any argument that
the term includes remitters. Section 1-201(20), amended in 1990 at
the same time as article 3, says that holder means "the person in
possession . . . in the case of an instrument payable to an identified
person, if the identified person is in possession."'" A remitter does not
satisfy this definition because, although the remitter has possession,
the instrument is not payable to the remitter.'" Instead, it is payable
to another identified person (the payee) .'"As noted above, one official
comment adopts precisely this view.'"
The pre-revision definition of "holder" in article 1—still in effect
in many states—does not eliminate remitters as clearly as revised sec-
128 See id. § 3-312(c).
129 See U.C.C. §§ 3-412 (issuer), 3-414(b) (drawer), 3-415(a) (indorser). See also Part IV.A.
13° U.C.C. § 3-301.
131 Id.
132 See id. § 1-201(20).
I"See id. § 3-103(a)( I I ) (defining a remitter as "a person who purchases an instrument
from its issuer if the instrument is payable to an identified person other than the purchaser").
134 See id.
"5 See U.C.C. § 3-302 ant. 4.
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tion 1-201(20). It says that holder means "a person who is in possession
of . . . an instrument . . . drawn, issued, or indorsed to him or his
order." On the basis of this definition, the treatise written by Hawk-
land and others asks: "[W]hen the instrument is first delivered to the
remitter, is not the remitter a person 'in possession of an instrument
... issued . . . to him'?"'" If a remitter qualifies as a holder under this
definition, then a remitter has a right to enforce the instrument.
This argument presents two difficulties. First, as the treatise itself
recognizes, the pre-revision text and comments draw a distinction
between holders and remitters.'" The pre-revision section 3-
102(1) (a), in particular, defines "issue" as the first delivery to a "holder
or a remitter."'" That language does not make sense unless remitters
differ from holders.
Second, the definition of holder appears incomplete as written.
Examining the language carefully, it defines a holder as a person who
has an instrument "issued . . . to him" or who has an instrument
"issued . . . to his order." The latter phrase has no meaning. Article 3
defines "issue" as a delivery to a person;'" an issuer thus cannot issue
an instrument to a person's order.
The original section 1-201(20) must be leaving something out. It
must be referring not merely to the issuance of the instrument, but
also to the way in which the instrument is made payable. Because
instruments are not payable to remitters, remitters would not seem to
qualify as holders under either the revised or pre-revision version of
article 3.
b. Nonholders in Possession
The second clause of section 3-301 states that, in addition to
holders, persons entitled to enforce an instrument also include non-
holders in possession with the rights of holders."' A moment's reflec-
tion, though, reveals that this statement suffers from circularity. A
holder has one principal right: the right to enforce an instrument.
Thus, in effect, section 3-301 (ii) is saying that a person has a right to
enforce if the person is not a holder but has the right to enforce.
138 See U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (1989).
137 144wKLAND ET AL., supra note I, § 4-104:03.
138 See id.
139 See U.C.C. § 3-102(1)(a) (1989).
140 See id.
141 U.C.C. § 3-301 (ii) (1990).
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The circularity, however, does not undermine the second clause
altogether. Although the clause does not indicate how a nonholder
might acquire the right to enforce, the clause at least makes clear that
a nonholder can have such a right. As a result, remitters are not
excluded from the class of persons entitled to enforce merely because
they do not meet the definition of a holder.
The drafters of the Code appear to have had a particular example
in mind in the second clause of section 3-301. The typical "nonholder
in possession with the rights of a holder" is a person to whom a holder
has assigned or "transferred" the right to enforce.'" For example,
suppose that a drawer issues a personal check to a payee. The payee
then delivers and assigns all rights in the check to a third party, but
does not indorse the instrument.
The third party does not qualify as a holder because the instru-
ment is still payable to the payee. 41 3 yet, the third party can enforce the
instrument because the payee has assigned the right to enforce. The
third party, in other words, has become "a nonholder in possession
with the rights of a holder."
The question of whether remitters also may fit into the second
clause of section 3-301 does not have an easy answer. There are
arguments on both sides. Yet, the one good argument that courts
should not consider remitters "nonholders in possession with the
rights of holders" is outweighed by two arguments for the opposite
conclusion.
The argument that a remitter does not have the rights of a holder
rests on a simple idea: Unlike the third party in the example above, to
whom all the rights in the check were assigned, no one transfers any
rights to the remitter. Because the remitter purchases the instrument
directly from the issuer, only the issuer could give the remitter any
rights. By definition, however, the issuer makes the instrument payable
to "an identified person other than" the remitter.'" The issuer, there-
fore, does not appear to give the remitter the right to enforce.
The two arguments that remitters have the right to enforce and
thus qualify as "nonholders in possession with the rights of holders"
are more complicated. The first rests on the doctrine of merger. The
doctrine of merger states that a negotiable instrument is "a reified right
to payment" and that the "right is represented by the instrument
itself."5 For example, when a bank issues a cashier's check, the piece
"2 See id. § 3-20I(a) (permitting transfer of rights without indorsement).
See id. § 1-201(20) (defining holder).
141 1d. § 3-103(a)(11).
143/d. § 3-203 cmt. I.
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of paper upon which the check is written becomes a physical embodi-
ment of a right to obtain payment from the bank.'"
The doctrine of merger has two principal consequences. First, a
person who does not have possession of an instrument generally can-
not enforce it.'" Because the right to payment has become reified, a
person cannot have the right if someone else has the paper in which
the right has become subsumed. Second, a person who has rightful
possession of an instrument generally has the right to enforce it.'"
Otherwise, a reified right might exist that no one owns—a result that
would conflict with general notions of property law.
On the basis of these principles, a remitter should have the right
to enforce an instrument prior to negotiating it to the payee. After
purchasing the instrument, the remitter has possession of a reified
right to enforce. No one else has a claim to that right until the remitter
negotiates or transfers the instrument. Even if the remitter does not
qualify as a holder and has not dealt with a holder, the remitter
nonetheless stands in the position of a holder. Courts thus may de-
scribe the remitter as a nonholder in possession with the rights of a
holder.
Second, remitters should have the right to enforce because two
very important provisions of article 3 would not make sense otherwise.
As explained below, sections 3-416 and 3-417 state that, in certain
circumstances, a person who transfers an instrument warrants that he
or she is a person entitled to enforce the instrument.'" Remitters
transfer instruments whenever they deliver them to a payee.'" Thus,
every remitter who uses a cashier's check or other instrument to pay
for anything would incur liability for breach of warranty unless remit-
ters have a right to enforce. That result simply does not make sense.
To avoid breaches of warranty and remain consistent with the
merger doctrine, courts should conclude that remitters have a right to
enforce instruments even though the issuer does not expressly give the
1118 See generally Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13
Cat3oirroN L. Rev. 441,449 (1979) (contending that this doctrine "which the first time you run
into it, sounds like nonsense" is what gives the law of negotiable instruments Its pure and almost
unearthly beauty").
147 See U.C.C. § 3-301 (1990) (requiring possession, except in cases covered by § 3-309 and
§ 3-418(d)).
148 Even if someone else has a claim to the instrument, the person in possession still may
have the right to enforce it. For example, a thief who steals a bearer instrument can enforce it.
See id. § 3-301 ("A person may be a person entitled to enforce the instrument even though the
person is not the owner of the instrument or is in wrongful possession of the instrument.").
118 M. §§ 3-416(1)(a), 3-417(a) (1), (d) (1).
15° See infra Part IV.E (discussing transfers) and Parst 1V.13—.0 (discussing transfer and pre-
sentment warranties).
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remitter that right. Courts do not have to give the right to enforce to
remitters as a matter of common law. Instead, they may conclude that
the remitters fall within the category of nonholders in possession with
the rights of holders and thus have the right to enforce under section
3-301 (ii).
c. Other Persons
Section 3-301's third clause includes as persons entitled to en-
force "a person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to
enforce the instrument pursuant to Section 3-309 or 3-418(d)."'"
Section 3-309 includes persons who were holders or nonholders in
possession with the rights of holders, but have lost their instruments.
Under the reasoning above, if a remitter loses an instrument, the
remitter should be able to use section 3-309 to enforce MI" The essay
discusses this point more fully below.'" Section 3-418(d), by contrast,
applies only to banks and others that pay instruments by mistake; it
does not appear to have any application to remitters.'"
B. Right to Slap Payment
Section 4-403(a) gives the drawer of a personal check a statutory
right to "stop payment."55 To exercise this right, the drawer merely has
to instruct the bank not to pay a particular check.'" So long as a bank
has a "reasonable opportunity" to act on the instruction, it must com-
ply.'" If the bank pays the check despite a stop payment order, it must
compensate the drawer for any loss resulting from the payment.'"
Drawers typically exercise the right to stop payment if they dis-
cover that, for some reason, they should not have delivered a particular
check. For example, suppose a consumer pays a merchant for goods
with a check, but then discovers that the goods have a defect. The
consumer may wish to instruct the bank not to pay the check. Stopping
payment will not eliminate the consumer's liability on the check, but
it will give the consumer leverage in settling any subsequent dispute.'"
151 U.C.C. § 3-301 (iii) (1990).
I52This conclusion directly conflicts with an official comment. See id. § 3-312 cmt. 4 (indi-
cating remitters must use § 3-312 if they lose an instrument).
155See infra Part IV.G.
154 See U.C.C. § 3-418(d) (1990).
155 See id. § 4-403.
156 See id. § 4-403(a).
I" Id.
158 See id. § 4-403(c).
159The consumer will continue to have liability under § 3-414(6), which says that "[i]f an
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Remitters who use cashier's checks or teller's checks to pay for
items often have a comparable desire to stop their payment. For exam-
ple, suppose a remitter gives a car dealer a cashier's check as a down
payment for an automobile, but the dealer refuses to convey the vehi-
cle. The remitter may ask the bank not to pay the cashier's check to
gain leverage over the dealer.
Some banks voluntarily will comply with such requests by remit-
ters.'" If the bank refuses, however, most courts and commentators
recognize no right of the remitter to recover damages from the bank
for the payment of the check.'6' This view is correct.
Section 4-403 does not apply to cashier's checks. It grants the
customer of a bank the right to stop payment on drafts from "the
customer's account."62 Remitters are not necessarily customers of a
bank, because the Code defines customer as "a person having an
account" with the bank.'" Banks, moreover, draw cashier's checks on
their own accounts, not on the accounts of customers.'64
Courts should not invent a common law right allowing remitters
to recover from banks for refusing to obey a stop payment order for
two reasons. First, as always, creation of such a right would conflict with
the policy of maintaining the status quo, outlined in Part III above. It
would encourage remitter transactions by making the position of re-
mitters more favorable.
Second, giving remitters the right to stop payment would conflict
with a key provision of article 3. Section 3-411(b) presently prohibits
banks from wrongfully refusing to pay cashier's checks or stopping
payment on teller's checks.'" Refusing or stopping payment on these
unaccepted draft is dishonored, the drawer is obliged to pay the draft ... according to its terms
at the time it was issued...." U.C.C. § 11-4 I 4(b).
le" See id. § 3-411 cmt. 1 (3/4 [S]ome banks will refuse payment as an accotnmodation to a
customer."). As noted below, however, the Code prohibits this practice in most instances.
181 See, e.g., Seman v. First State Bank, 394 N.W.2(1 557, 560 (Minn. Ct. App, 1986); National
Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano, 268 A.2d 327, 329 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970); Abilities,
Inc. v. Citibank, 449 N.Y.S.2d 242, 243 (App. Div. 1982); HAWKLAND rr AL., Supra note 1, at
§ 3-104:18 at n.7; Michigan Note, supra note 74, at 426. Tobin, supra note 73, at 262.
Money orders differ from cashier's checks and teller's checks, Like personal checks, many
courts hold that a remitter may stop payment on them. See, e.g., Chicago Cicero Currency Exch.,
Inc. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank, 545 N.E.2d 259, 262 (III. App. Ct. 1989); Duggan v. State Bank
of Antioch, 540 N.E.2d 1111 (III. App. CL 1989).
1332 § 4-403 (1990).
I63/d. § 4-104(a)(5).
See Dziurak v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 406 N.Y.S.2d 30, 30 (1978) (remitter cannot stop
payment because "a cashier's check does not constitute an item payable for a customer's account
within the meaning of ... section 4-403... ."); see also U.C.C. § 3-411 cmt. 1(1990) ("A debtor
ttsing any of these types of checks [i.e., cashier's, teller's, and certified checks] has no right to
stop payment.").
165 U.C.C. § 3-411(b).
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instruments is wrongful unless the bank has a defense that the bank
may assert against the person presenting the instrument.' 66
The Code makes clear what kinds of defenses a bank may assert.
The bank, naturally, may assert its own defenses to payment.' 67 For
example, unless the person presenting the check has the rights of a
holder in due course, the bank could assert as a defense the failure of
the remitter to give consideration for it.'"
The Code, however, specifically forbids the obligor of an instru-
ment to "assert against [a] person entitled to enforce the instrument
a defense, claim in recoupment, or claim to the instrument . . . of
another person." 169 Thus, with few exceptions,'" a bank may not refuse
to pay a cashier's check or stop payment of a teller's check merely
because a remitter has an objection to the paymentin A common law
rule requiring banks to act on remitter's stop payment orders would
undermine these statutory rules.
C. Right to Recover for Wrongful Payment
The drawer of a personal check is protected if the bank pays the
check to the wrong person. Under section 4-401, a bank only may
charge "against the account of a customer an item that is properly
166 See id. § 3-411(b) emu. 3.
167 See id. § 3-305(a).
168 See Godat v. Mercantile Bank, 1994 WL 313506, at *4 (Mo. Ct. App. July 5, 1994) (bank
could assert its own defense of failure of consideration from remitter against payee of cashier's
check because payee was not a HIDC). But see Wertz v. Richardson Heights Bank & Trust, 495
S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. 1973) (bank issuing a cashier's check had to pay it even though there was
a failure of consideration from the remitter); Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 370 F. Supp.
276, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (same); 'rahoada v. Bank of Babylon, 408 N.Y.S.2d 734, 735 (D. Ct. 1978)
(same).
169 See U.C.C.  § 3-305(c) (1990).
17°A bank may assert a remitter's claim to an instrument as a defense to payment, but only
if the remitter is joined as a party to a lawsuit seeking enforcement. See id.; see also Fulton Nat'l
Bank v. Delco Corp., 195 S.E.2d 455,457 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973) (issuing bank may defend on ground
that remitter has a claim to the instrument); Michigan Note, supra note 74, at 438-39. Some
courts have taken a more absolute stance, apparently not caring whether the remitter may have
a claim to the instrument. See, e.g., State ex rel. Chan Siew Lai v. Powell, 536 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. 1976)
(en bane); National Newark & Essex Bank v. Ciordano, 268 A.2d 327 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1970). Commentators properly have criticized these cases as not following the Code. See
Lawrence, supra note 74, at 289 & n. 50 (citing additional cases); see also Davis, supra note 74,
at 627-28.
171 See Louis Falcigno Enters., Inc. v. Massachusetts Bank & Trust Co., 436 N.E.2d 993, 995
(Mass. App. Ct. 1982); Moon Over The Mountain, Ltd. v. Marine Midland Bank, 386 N.Y.S.2d
974, 978 (Civ. Ct. 1976); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Ducan Say. & Loan Ass'n, 957 F.2d 775, 777
(10th Cir. 1992) (money order); Warren Finance v. Barnett Bank, 552 So.2d 194, 198 (Fla. 1989)
(bank could not assert defense of one of two purchasing payees); Fur Funtastic, Ltd. v. Kearns,
430 N.Y.S.2d 27, 29 (Civ. Ct. 1980) (dicta).
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payable."72 A personal check is "properly payable" only if the payment
is authorized by the customer.'"
For example, suppose that a drawer delivers a check to a mer-
chant. Before the merchant endorses the instrument, a thief steals it.
Unless an exception applies,'" the bank will bear the loss if it pays the
thief. The bank cannot debit the customer's account because the
customer did not authorize payment.'"
The Code does not make clear what rights a remitter would have
in a comparable situation. Suppose that a remitter buys a cashier's
check and sends it to the payee. Before the payee collects the instru-
ment, someone steals the check and presents it to a bank for payment.
Does the remitter have any rights against the bank in this case or in
similar cases?
A number of cases have held that remitters may collect damages
from banks that pay cashier's checks to the wrong person.'" These
cases, however, have disagreed about the basis for liability. Some courts
have applied section 4-401 to cases involving cashier's checks while
other courts have based liability on an implied contract theory or
conversion. The first two approaches are wrong. Courts should reject
liability based on section 4-401 or an implied contract theory. In
limited circumstances, however, remitters should have a right to re-
cover from banks for conversion.
Section 4-401 simply does not apply to cashier's checks. It con-
cerns the ability of a bank to charge a customer's account. A bank does
not charge a remitter's account when it pays a cashier's check because
172 See U.C.C. § 4-401(a) (1990).
173 See id.
In For exceptions to the general rule in § 4-401(a), see, e.g., id. § 4-406(c) (customer
precluded from denying authority of certain signatures because of delay in informing the bank);
§ 3-406(a) (customer precluded because of customer's negligence).
173 For exceptions to § 4-401(a), see, e.g., id, §§ 3-406(a), 4-406(d).
173 See, e.g., Jerman v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say., 87 Cal. Rptr. 88,92 (Ct. App. 1970);
Gillespie v. Riley Management Corp., 319 N.E.2d 753, 758 (111. 1974); Lassen v. First Bank Eden
Prairie, 514 N.W.2d 831, 836-37 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); Twellman v. Lindell Trust Co., 534 S.W.2d
83, 97-98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Kosic v. Marine Midland Bank, 430 N.Y.S.2d 175, 177 (App. Div.
1980), affd, 430 N.E.2d 1317 (N.Y. 1981),
For related cases, see also Meador v. Ranchmart State Bank, 517 112d 123, 130 (Kan. 1973)
(remitter's action against bank for paying a cashier's check with improper indorsements dismissed
because the indorsements were proper); State ex rel. Chan Slew Lai v. Powell, 536 S.W.2d 14, 16
(Mo. 1976) (remitter could not enjoin hank's payment of a cashier's check to person entitled to
payment); First State Bank v. Hughes, 654 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (remitter named
as co-payee challenged payment of check without his endorsement; summary judgment inappro-
priate because of undecided issues).
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the remitter already has purchased the check. In fact, the remitter may
not even have an account at the bank.'"
Some courts have held banks liable to remitters on a theory that
banks make an implied promise to remitters that they will pay checks
only upon a proper indorsement.' 78 Courts should hesitate to adopt
this approach for two reasons. Absent evidence that the bank and the
remitter actually made such a contract, recognizing this implied con-
tract would amount to granting remitters a common law right to sue
banks. As explained above in Part III, courts should maintain the status
quo and avoid creating new rights for remitters.
Furthermore, remitters do not need the protection of an implied
contract. Several rules protect remitters in situations in which someone
steals a cashier's check or a remitter's check. To understand these
rules, it is necessary to distinguish two different situations. In one,
someone steals the check from the remitter directly. In the other, a
remitter delivers the check to the payee, and then someone steals it.
If someone steals the check directly from the remitter and then
cashes it, the remitter can sue the bank for conversion. Section 3-
420(a) provides that an instrument is converted if "a bank makes .. .
payment with respect to the instrument for a person not entitled to
enforce the instrument . . . ." 179 This section excludes drawers and
persons who never received delivery from the class of possible plain-
tiffs, but does not exclude remitters.' 8° Remitters therefore may recover
under the provision.' 8 '
If the remitter negotiates the check to the payee or transfers it to
someone else, the remitter gives up ownership in the instrument. As a
result, if the bank pays the check to the wrong person, the remitter
177 Although one case seems to have disagreed with this conclusion, it involved peculiar facts
and may be wrongly decided. In Kosic v. Marine Midland Bank, 430 N.Y.S.2d 175 (App. Div. 1980),
affd 430 N.E.2d 1317 (N.Y. 1981), a court held that § 4-401 applied. According to the court,
Marine Midland Bank issued two "cashier's checks drawn on the account" of Kosic. Id. at 176.
The court held that the bank could not charge Kosic's account after paying the checks upon an
improper indorsement. Id. at 177. These facts seem a little weird. Cashier's checks, by definition,
are not drawn on a customer's account. See U.C.C. § 3-104(g) (1990) (defining a cashier's check
as one drawn by a bank on itself).
179 See, e.g., Lerman v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say., 87 Cal. Rpm 88,92 (Ct. App. 1970);
Lassen v. First Bank Eden Prairie, 514 N.W.2d 831,836-37 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); Twellman v.
Lindell Trust Co., 534 S.W.2d 83,97-98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
179 U.C.C. § 3-420(a). Section 3-419 of the pre-revision article 3 afforded the same right. See
U.C.C. § 3-419 (1989).
199 See U.C.C. § 3-420(a) (1990) ("An action for conversion ... may not be brought by (i)
the issuer or acceptor of the instrument or (ii) a payee or indorsee who did not receive delivery
of the instrument . . .").
191 See jerman, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 92 (citing pre-revision § 3-419(1)(c) as a basis for holding a
bank liable to a remitter for paying a cashier's check without proper indorsement); Steenbergen
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may not recover for conversion.'" The remitter, however, does not
need to sue for conversion. Under section 3-310(a), which implements
the doctrine of merger, the payee discharges the remitter by taking the
check.'" Therefore, the theft of the check becomes the payee's prob-
lem, not the remitter's.
D. Right to Recover for Wrongful Dishonor
Under section 4-402(6), if a bank refuses to pay a properly pay-
able personal check, the bank generally has to pay the drawer damages
for wrongful dishonor.'" Suppose, however, that a remitter delivers a
cashier's check or teller's check to a payee, but the bank refuses to
honor it. The remitter, like the drawer, also might wish to recover
damages for wrongful dishonor.
Nothing in the Code gives the remitter in this situation any rights
against the bank. Section 4-402(b) does not apply to remitter transac-
tions. The section requires banks to pay damages to a "customer"—an
account holder—by virtue of dishonoring an item drawn on the cus-
tomer's account.'" Again, remitters do not qualify.
Courts, however, should not create this right as a matter of com-
mon law for two reasons. First, as always, courts should not supplement
the statutory rights of a remitter with new common law rights. Again,
although courts may have the power under section 1-103, they should
not encourage remitter transactions.'"
Second, remitters of cashier's checks do not need a right to re-
cover for wrongful dishonor. By taking a cashier's check from the
v. First Fed. Say. Sc Loan, 753 11.2d 1330,1331 (Okla. 1987) (bank liable to remitter 1hr conversion
where bank stopped payment on a teller's check and then issued a replacement check to a third
party, thus effectively paying the check to wrong person); l'IAWKLAND ET AL., SUPECI MAE I, at
(1 3-419:04.
Cases that have held that remitters never have a right to collect for conversion seem wrong.
See Twellman v. Lindell Trust Co., 534 3,141.2d 83,97-98 (Mo. CL App. 1976) (holding conversion
actions unnecessary hecause of the implied contract between the bank and the remitter) jernian,
87 Cal. Rptr. at 95 (Fleming, )., concurring) (same).
182 See Lassen v. First Bank Eden Prairie, 514 N.W.2d 831,838-839 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994),
183 See U.C.C. § 3-310(a) MI If a certified check, cashier's check, or teller's check is taken
for an obligation, the obligation is discharged to the same extent that discharge would result if
an amount of money ea:0 to the :01101Int of the instrument were taken in payment of the
obligation.").
184 See id. § 4-402(b) ("A payor bank is liable to its customer for damages proximately caused
by the wrongful dishonor of an item.").
186 See id. § 4-402(a)-(c) and MI 5; id. § 4-104(a) (5) (defining "customer"); see also Tobin,
supra note 75, at 263 ("the [bank's) contract to pay runs not to remitter but to the holder of the
instrument").
186See MIMI Part III.C,I.a.
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remitter, the payee discharges the remitter's obligations.' 87 As a result,
no matter what the bank does, the remitter faces no liability. By con-
trast, when the payee takes a personal check, the payee only suspends
the obligation; if the bank dishonors the check, the obligation re-
vives.' 88
E. Right to Negotiate and Transfer
Persons in possession of negotiable instruments generally do one
of two things with them. They either enforce them (as discussed above)
or they assign the right to enforce them to someone else. Assignments
under article 3 come in two forms: negotiations and transfers.
Section 3-201(a) defines a negotiation as a "transfer of possession,
whether voluntary or involuntary, of an instrument . . . to a person
who thereby becomes its holder." 189 Section 3-203(a) addresses trans-
fers. It states: "An instrument is transferred when it is delivered by a
person other than its issuer for the purpose of giving to the person
receiving delivery the right to enforce the instrument." 90
The two forms of assignment overlap to a certain extent. Some
assignments qualify as both negotiations and transfers. Others qualify
as only one or the other. For example, an involuntary transfer of
possession may constitute a negotiation, but not a transfer. Likewise,
an assignment to a person who does not become a holder may qualify
as a transfer but not a negotiation.
The distinction between negotiations and transfers has consider-
able significance. When a person merely transfers an instrument, but
does not negotiate it, the transferee takes the instrument subject to
competing claims of ownership and any defenses that the issuer may
have to its payment. 19 ' By contrast, when a person negotiates an instru-
ment—whether or not the negotiation is also a transfer—the recipient
potentially could take the instrument free of these claims and de-
fenses.I 92
187 See U.C.C. § 3-310(a) (1990).
188 See id. § 3-310(h). For the right of the remitter to rescind a fraudulently induced nego-
tiation, see infra Part 1V.F.
189 Id. § 3-201.
19° Id. § 3-203(a).
191 See id. § 3-305(a).
I 92 To take free of claims and defenses, the recipient must meet the definition of a "holder
in due course." See U.C.C. § 3-302 (defining holder in due course); § 3-305(6) (indicating the
defense not applicable to a holder in due course); § 3-306 (indicating claims of ownership not
applicable to a holder in due course),
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When a remitter delivers an instrument to the payee, the payee
becomes a holder, a person in possession of an instrument payable to
him or her.'" The remitter thus negotiates the instrument. Provided
that the remitter makes the delivery voluntarily—or, more specifically,
for the purpose of giving the payee the right to enforce it—the remitter
also transfers it.
When the remitter attempts to assign the instrument to someone
other than the payee, the assignment cannot constitute a negotiation
because only the payee can become the holder of the instrument.
Whether a remitter may "transfer" an instrument to a person other
than the payee poses more of' a problem because of the uncertainty
over whether a remitter has the right to enforce an instrument.
The recent case of Michaud v. Community Savings Bank exem-
plifies the problem."' A remitter named Cocopardi bought a cashier's
check payable to Community Savings Bank.'" Cocopardi then gave the
instrument to another person named Michaud.'" The exchange be-
tween Cocopardi and Michaud did not qualify as a negotiation because
Michaud did not become a holder. Although she had possession, the
check was not payable to her. So long as the check was payable only to
Community Savings Bank, only the bank could be its holder.
Whether the exchange constituted a transfer would depend on
whether Cocopardi delivered the instrument to Michaud for the pur-
pose of giving her the right to enforce. Courts which have held that
remitters do not have the right to enforce would conclude that no
transfer did or could occur.'" The court in Michaud took this position;
it explained: "Cocopardi is a remitter and Cocopardi had no right to
enforce the instrument as the remitter, and as the remitter and not a
'holder' he cannot transfer any rights he may have as a 'holder'—he
has none—to Michaud.""
If remitters can enforce instruments, as this essay suggests above,
the result would change. The exchange between Cocopardi and
Michaud would constitute a transfer. If Cocopardi, the remitter, had
the right to enforce, then he could give that the right to Michaud, or
to anyone else.'"
LW/See id. § 1-201(20),
194 No. CIV.92-05160243,1994 WL 146371, at *2-3 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994).
198 Id. at I.
196
197 See supra Part 1V.B.
198 Michaud, 1994 WL 146371, at *2.
199 See U.C.C. § 3-203(a) (1990) (defining transfer).
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F. Right to Recover Possession
Remitters may wish to recover possession of instruments in two
instances. First, after the remitter purchases an instrument but before
the remitter delivers it to the payee, the instrument may be lost or
stolen. The remitter then may wish to recover the instrument from the
finder or the thief'. Second, after the remitter delivers the instrument
to the payee, the remitter may change his or her mind about the
transaction and want the instrument back.
Courts generally should allow remitters to recover instruments
that fall into the hands of finders or thieves. Section 3-306 provides
that any person (other than a holder in due course) takes an instru-
ment "subject to a claim of a property or possessory right in the
instrument or its proceeds." 20" Under this provision, because the remit-
ter owns the instrument, the remitter could sue a finder or thief to
recover the instrument or its proceeds."' As permitted by state law, the
remitter also might assert a claim for damages under a theory of
conversion." 2
Suppose that the remitter does not lose the instrument, but in-
stead negotiates it to the payee. The remitter then discovers that the
payee committed fraud. In this case, the remitter also may be able to
recover possession. Section 3-306 states that a person who takes an
instrument takes it subject to "a claim to rescind a negotiation." 203
Moreover, section 3-202(b) provides that "No the extent permitted
by other law, negotiation may be rescinded." 204 Thus, if state law would
permit rescission for fraud or any other applicable ground, the remit-
ter could rescind the negotiation and assert a claim to the instru-
ment."'
2°1 ' Id§ 3-306.
201 The remitter owns the instrument because the remitter, by definition, purchased it from
the issuer. See hi. § 3-103(a)(11). If the finder or thief negotiated the instrument to the payee,
the payee might take it as holder in due course. In that case, under an express exception to
section 3-306, the remitter would have no claim against the payee. See id. § 3-306. For an
example, see Burke v. Mission Bay Yacht Sales, 29 Cal. Rptr. 685,691 (1963) (remitter allowed
to recover proceeds of cashier's check in wrongful possession).
282 See U .C.C. § 3-420(a) ("The law applicable to conversion of personal property applies to
instruments.").
203 id .
"4 1d. § 3-202(6).
2115 The payee could not escape the claim by virtue of having the status of a holder in due
course. Section 3-203(6) says that a person may not assert a right of rescission "against a
subsequent holder in due course or a person paying the instrument in good faith and without
knowledge of (nets that are a basis for rescission or another remedy." Id. § 3-202(b). The payee
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G. Right with Respect to Lost Instruments
If a remitter loses an instrument, the remitter cannot sue to
recover possession because the remitter would not know whom to sue.
Revised article 3, however, creates a special procedure that remitters
may use when they have lost cashier's checks and teller's checks.
Section 3-312 allows a remitter to file a declaration of loss with
the issuing hank R 00 If no one entitled to enforce the check presents it
within ninety days of its issuance, the bank must pay the remitter the
amount of the check. 207 The remitter, however, incurs a small risk. If a
holder in due course presents the check, he or she may enforce it
against the remitter. 2"
Remitters may have an additional option. Section 3-309 permits
a person to enforce a lost instrument if the person "was in possession
of the instrument and entitled to enforce it when the loss of possession
occurred:" The issue of whether remitters have a right to enforce
again arises. A comment to the revised article 3 states that remitters
cannot use section 3-309 because they have no right to enforce. 21 °
Courts that hold that remitters do have a right to enforce should
disagree with this comment. They should allow remitters to use section
3-309 as well as section 3-312. 2 "
V. THE LIABILITIES OF REMITTERS
Although remitters have many rights, they also have a variety of
liabilities or potential liabilities. Under the theory expressed in Part III
would not be a "subsequent' holder in due course and, in most instances, would have knowledge
of the relevant facts.
2°6 See U.C.G. § 3-312(b) (1990).
2°7 See id. § 3-312(6)(1), (2).
20s
	 id. § 3-312(c).
200 Id. § 3-309(a). The remitter may exercise this right only if the remitter "adequately
protect[M" the hank against the possibility of liability to another claimant. See id. § 3-309(b). For
example, the remitter may have to post a bond equal to the amount of the instrument. See Santos
v. First Nat'l State Bank, 451 A.2(1 401,414 (NI Super. 0. App. Div. 1982).
210 See U.C.C. § 3-312 cat. I (1990) ("Section 3-309 applies only to a person entitled to
enforce the check. It does not apply to a remitter of a cashier's check or teller's check ....").
211 Section 3-309 in the revised version of article 3 replaces § 3-804 in the pre-revision
version. Section 3-804 said: - lite owner of an instrument which is lost ... may maintain an action
in his own name and recover from any party liable .. ." U.C.C. § 3-804 (1989). That language
seems to include remitters even more clearly than the language of § 3-309. In Parker v. Dudley,
527 So.2d 240,243 (Fla. Dist. 0. App. 1988), a court allowed a remitter to collect the amount.
of lost cashier's checks, Although the court did not cite § 3-804, it explained that the remitter
"owns [the checks] and what they represent if they have not been 'delivered' to the payee." Id.
at 242.
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above, courts should impose on remitters all of the obligations estab-
lished by the Code.212 Furthermore, courts should hesitate to assign to
remitters additional liabilities as a matter of common law.213
A. Liability on an Instrument
A person who signs a negotiable instrument generally incurs a
form of what article 3 calls "liability on the instrument."2" For example,
the issuer of a note or a cashier's check incurs an obligation to pay the
instrument when it becomes due.215 The drawer and the indorser of a
check assume a slightly different obligation; they become liable to pay
the check if the drawee dishonors it.216
Most remitters do not sign the instruments that they purchase.
Section 3-201 (b), as explained above, states that remitters may nego-
tiate instruments merely by delivering them.2" The typical remitter, as
a result, negotiates the instrument to the payee without indorsing it.
The remitter thus does not become liable on the instrument.218
Remitters, however, sometimes sign instruments specifically for
the purpose of incurring liability. For example, the payee may ask the
remitter to indorse a cashier's check or teller's check. The remitter's
indorsement—an "anomalous indorsement" in article 3 terminol-
ogy219—would give the payee recourse against the remitter if the bank
failed to pay it:220
Courts do not have much discretion to fashion common law rules
with respect to liability on instruments. They cannot require remitters
to sign instruments because section 3-201(6) specifically states that
remitters do not have to sign them. Courts also cannot make a remitter
liable on an instrument without a signature because section 3-401
212 See supra Part 111.A.
213 See supra Part 111.C.
214 See U .C.C. § 3-401(a) (1990). Article 3 allows some parties to disclaim this liability. For
example, indorsers may disclaim liability on an instrument by indicating that they are signing
"without recourse." Id. § 3-415(1,). Drawers of checks, however, cannot disclaim this liability. See
id. § 3-414(e).
215 See id. § 3-412.
216 See id. § 3-414(1)) (obligation of drawers); id. § 3-4I5(a) (obligation of indorsers).
217 /d. § 3-201(6).
218 See BAILEY Er Al.., SUP/II note 34, 1 1.17, at 1-23 ("[Thei purchaser is often called a
remitter. The purchaser is not a party to the cashier's check ixself unless the purchaser adds his
own signature or indorsetnent to the instrument."); Tobin, supra note 73, at 261 (a remitter "is
not a party to the instrument and, consequently, he is in no way liable on it").
219 See U.C.C. § 3-205(d) (1990) (defining an "anomalous indorsement" as "an indorsement
by a person who is not the holder of the instrument").
220 see id. § 3-415(a) (liability of indorser).
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expressly states: "A person is not liable on an instrument unless . . .
the person signed the instrument . . .221 The statute thus precludes
any common law supplementation.
B. Liability for Breach of Implied Transfer Warranty
Participants in negotiable instruments transactions may incur li-
ability for breach of implied warranties. One kind of implied warranty
arises in the transfer of an instrument. Section 3-416(a) states that a
person who "transfers" an instrument for consideration warrants five
facts to the transferee:
(1) the warrantor is a person entitled to enforce the instru-
ment;
(2) all signatures on the instrument are authentic and author-
ized;
(3) the instrument has not been altered;
(4) the instrument is not subject to a defense or claim in
recoupment of any party which can be asserted against the
warrantor; and
(5) the warrantor has no knowledge of any insolvency pro-
ceeding commenced with respect to the maker or acceptor
or, in the case of an unaccepted draft, the drawer.222
If any of these facts proves false, the warrantor incurs liability for
breach of warranty.223
In proper circumstances, remitters may make the warranties listed
in section 3-416. Section 3-203(a), as noted earlier, defines a "transfer"
as the delivery of an instrument "for the purpose of giving to the
person receiving delivery the right to enforce the instrument. "224 As
explained in Part IV above, a remitter typically transfers an instrument
by negotiating it to the payee; the remitter delivers the instrument to
the payee precisely so that the payee may obtain payment from the
issuer.
Remitters may breach the transfer warranties that they make in
negotiating instruments to the payee in a variety of ways. For example,
if the remitter alters a cashier's check, the remitter will breach the
section 3-416(a) (3) warranty that the instrument has not been altered
221 Id. § 3-401(a).
222 See id. § 3-416(a). A person who not only transfers an it
	 but also indorses it,
warrants the facts to subsequent transferees as well. See id,
223 m. § 3-416(6).
224 U.C.C. § 3-203(a).
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when negotiating it to the payee. Likewise, if the remitter knows that
the issuer has a defense to payment, the remitter will breach the
warranty in section 3-416(a) (4). 225
Some courts will find problematic the implied warranty in section
3-416(a) (1), which states that "the warrantor is a person entitled to
enforce the instrument."'" As stated in Part IV above, although the
author and other commentators believe that remitters have the right
to enforce, not everyone agrees?'" Instead, some sources—including
an official comment to the Code—insist that remitters do not have the
right to enforce.""
Courts that accept the view that remitters cannot enforce appar-
ently must conclude that remitters breach the warranty in section
3-416(a) (1) every time they negotiate an instrument. That conclusion
seems rather odd. The Code, after all, specifically contemplates that
remitters will negotiate instruments."'"
Although unusual, courts nevertheless should keep this somewhat
anomalous result in perspective. In most cases, even if the remitter
breaches the warranty, the breach will cause few, if any, damages. The
payee, as a holder, will have the right to enforce even if the remitter
does not."'"
When a remitter delivers an instrument to a person other than
the payee, the delivery will not constitute a negotiation. Yet, courts
should hold that the delivery nonetheless constitutes a "transfer"
within the meaning of section 3-416(a). A transfer, as noted, is one
form of assignment. 23' If remitters have the right to enforce instru-
ments, they may assign that right to others. As a result, no matter to
whom the remitter delivers the instrument, the remitter will make all
of the warranties stated in section 3-416(a).
As discussed above, however, some sources disagree with this con-
clusion.'" Courts that believe that remitters do not have the right to
enforce, in particular, have concluded that a delivery to a person other
than the payee does not constitute a transfer.'" In such transactions,
225 See HAWK AND ET Al.., supra note 1, at § 3-802:02 (courts should "treat a remitter of a
bank instrument as a transferor who thereby gives to his transferee the warranty under § 3-
417(2)(d) (0989) or § 3-4I6(a)(4) (1990)1 that no defense is good against him.").
226 	§ 3-416(a)(1).
227 See infra Part IV.A.2.
22t See id.
220 See U.C.C. § 3-201(b) (1990).
230 See id. § 1-201(20) (defining holder); id. § 3-301 (stating that holders may enforce).
231 See supra Part W.E.
232 see
235 See, e.g., Michaud v. Community Say. Bank, No. CIV. 92-05160245,1994 WL 146371, at
*2-3 (Conn. Super. O. Apr. 8, 1994) (transferee of remitter did not have right to enforce).
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as a result, the courts would hold that the remitter does not make the
transfer warranties in section 3-416.
This conclusion should give courts pause. For example, suppose
that a remitter buys a cashier's check and then alters it. Instead of
delivering the instrument to the payee, the remitter sells it to a third
party. Unless the remitter makes transfer warranties under section
3-416(a), there is no protection for the third party.
Courts that find no liability under section 3-416 in these transac-
tions ought to impose the liability as a matter of common law. They
should conclude that remitters make the warranties in subsections
3-416(a) (2) through (a) (5), even if remitters cannot "transfer" within
the meaning of the Code. 234 Any other rule would surprise parties who
deal with remitters and who expect them to make the same kind of
warranties that others make when they transfer instruments.
C. Liability for Breach of Implied Presentment Warranty
A second kind of implied warranty arises in the presentment of
instruments for payment. Article 3 addresses these presentment war-
ranties in section 3-417. 2'5 These warranties have much in common
with the transfer warranties discussed above. Yet, determining when
and how they arise in remitter transactions involves several difficulties.
The first difficulty is whether the presentment warranties with
respect to cashier's checks differ from those with respect to teller's
checks. The second is whether remitters make presentment warranties
if they personally demand payment from the issuer. The third is
whether remitters make presentment warranties if they transfer the
instrument and someone else ultimately demands payment from the
issuer.
1. Presentment Warranties Made with Respect to Cashier's Checks
and Teller's Checks
Section 3-417 creates different warranties for different kinds of
instruments. Subsection (a) states three presentment warranties made
with respect to unaccepted drafts: "(1) the warrantor is, or was, at the
time the warrantor transferred the draft, a person entitled to enforce
the draft ...; (2) the draft has not been altered; and (3) the warrantor
has no knowledge that the signature of the drawer of the draft is
234 Because these courts hold that remitters do not have the right to enforce instruments,
they should not incorporate the warranty stated in § 3-416(a)(1)—that the transferor has the
right to enforce—into the common law.
135 U.C.C. § 3-417 (1990).
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unauthorized."2" Subsection (d) (1) states one presentment warranty
made with respect to other instruments: "[T] he warrantor is, or was,
at the time the warrantor transferred the instrument, a person entitled
to enforce the instrument . . . "37
The warranties remitters typically make depend on whether the
remitter purchases a teller's check or a cashier's check.2" Article 3
defines both of these instruments as drafts.2" The question thus arises
whether they constitute "unaccepted drafts."
Section 3-409(a) defines acceptance as "the drawee's signed
agreement to pay a draft as presented."24° It explains further that
acceptance "may consist of the drawee's signature alone."24' Under this
definition, a teller's check would not be an accepted draft. The three
warranties stated in section 3-417(a), as a result, would apply to teller's
checks.
Cashier's checks require more analysis. Because the same bank is
both the drawer and the drawee of a cashier's check, the drawee by
definition has signed the instrument.242 Cashier's checks thus appear
to meet the definition of accepted drafts. Many sources, as a result,
have described cashier's checks as "accepted" instruments.243
Yet, the conclusion that cashier's checks are accepted drafts poses
a significant difficulty. Section 3-409(d) defines a "certified check" as
"a check accepted by the bank on which it is drawn."244 If cashier's
checks are accepted, then under section 3-409(d), all cashier's checks
are certified checks. That conclusion, although possible, seems rather
odd. The Code, after all, distinguishes cashier's checks from certified
checks in many places.2" As a result, some courts may wish to treat
cashier's checks like teller's checks and conclude that they do not
qualify as accepted drafts.
23'1 Id. § 3-417(a).
2" 	 § 3-417(d)(1).
2" See supra Part 11.B.2.
2"SeeU.C.C.§ 3-104(g)-(h) 0990).
210M. § 3-409(a).
241 Id.
242 See id. § 3-103(a)(3) (defining drawer as "a person who signs ... a draft.. ."); id. § 3—
l04(g) (defining a cashier's check as "a draft with respect to which the drawer and drawee are
the same bank or branches of the same bank").
243 See Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 370 F. Supp. 276,278 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); National
Newark & Essex Bank v. Giordano, 268 A.2d 327,329 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970); Michigan
Note, supra note 74, at 425 n.14 Tobin, supra note 73, at 261-262.
244 	 § 3-409(d) (1990).
243 See, e.g., id. § 3-412 (stating obligations of issuer on a cashier's check); id. § 3-414(a)
(suiting obligations of acceptor of draft).
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If courts conclude that cashier's checks are accepted drafts, they
should hold that persons who present them make only the warranty
listed in section 3-41 7(d) (1). Courts have no reason to adopt rules
establishing additional warranties as a matter of common law. Banks
that issue cashier's checks do not need much protection; they can
determine by examining their own books whether a check has been
altered or the signature of the drawer (i.e., its own signature) is un-
authorized.
2. Presentment Directly by the Remitter
One way that a person may make the presentment warranties
stated in section 3-41 7 is by presenting the instrument directly to the
issuer or drawee and obtaining payment on 4.246 The warranties made
would run to the person paying the instrument. For example, anyone
who cashes a personal check makes presentment warranties to the
payor bank.
A few remitters may present instruments directly to a bank. For
example, suppose a remitter buys a cashier's check or teller's check
from a bank, but later decides not to negotiate it to the payee. Having
no need for the check, the remitter returns to the bank and demands
and receives payment for it. In such a case, the remitter ordinarily
would make the presentment warranties in section 3-41 7.
Whether a remitter presents an unaccepted draft or other instru-
ment, the remitter will warrant that he or she "is entitled to enforce."247
Courts that believe remitters have no right to enforce must conclude
that remitters automatically breach this warran ty.248 That conclusion,
like many others that follow from saying that a remitter cannot enforce,
seems a little strange. Yet, in most cases the bank will not suffer any
damages.
Courts believing that remitters have a right to enforce generally
will decide that remitters do not breach the warranty. In a few cases,
however, a breach might occur. For example, suppose that a remitter
negotiates an instrument to a payee but later steals it back. At that
point, even though the remitter has possession, the remitter would not
276 Section 3-4I7(a) states: "If an unaccepted draft is presented to the drawee for payment
... the person obtaining payment ... warrant[s] to the drawee making payment" the facts listed
in paragraphs (a)(I) through (a)(3). Id. § 3-417(0. Section 3-417(d) states that "if ... any other
instrument is presented for payment to a party obliged to pay the instrument ... [t]he person
obtaining payment . . . warnings] to the [drawee] " the !het stated in paragraph (d)(I).
§ 3-417(d).
247 See id. § 3-417(a)(1), (d)(2).
248 See supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing whether remitters have a right to enforce).
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have the right to enforce because the remitter would have given that
right to the payee in the negotiation. The remitter thus would breach
the warranty that the remitter is entitled to enforce. 299
Remitters who present unaccepted drafts—like teller's checks—
also make two additional warranties. As discussed above, they warrant
that "the draft has not been altered" 25° and that they "have no knowl-
edge that the signature of the drawer of the draft is unauthorized." 25 '
If the remitter alters or forges a teller's check, the remitter naturally
would breach these warranties.
Some remitters may attempt to avoid charges of breach of war-
ranty by asserting that they have not presented an instrument. 252 They
may claim that they instead merely returned the check to ask for a
refund. While article 3 says that persons who present instruments make
implied warranties, it does not say that persons who seek to rescind
the purchase of an instrument make any such warranties.
Courts should thwart this argument. They should hold that, as a
matter of common law, remitters make implied warranties when they
return instruments for a refund. These warranties should resemble the
warranties stated in section 3-417, with one change. The remitter
should warrant that he or she has a right to obtain a refund as opposed
to a right to enforce. Failure to hold that the remitters make additional
implied warranties would surprise the many who deal with them.
3. Presentment by Someone Other Than the Remitter
A person may make a presentment warranty even without present-
ing an instrument directly to the drawee. The person merely has to
transfer the instrument prior to its ultimate presentment. Section
3-417(a) states that, upon the presentment of an unaccepted draft,
not only "the person obtaining payment," but also "a previous trans-
249 Facts like these arise fairly frequently. See, e.g., Runge Corp. v. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co., 286 N.E.2d 903,906 (N.Y 1972) (remitter delivered checks to payee but later wrong-
fully reacquired them). The author, however, could find no case in which the bank sued the
remitter for breach of presentment warranty.
250 See U .0 .C. § 3-417 (a) (2) (1990).
251 See &L § 3-417(a) (2 ) , (a).
252 So me remitters may have a quirky argument to support this position. Section 3-501(a)
defines a presentment as "a demand made by ... a person entitled to en1brce an instrument ...
to pay the instrument... ." See id. § 3-501(a). Courts that believe that remitters do not have
rights to enforce instruments thus might have to hold that remitters could not make presentment
warranties because they cannot present. The definition in § 3-501(a), however, does not square
well with § 3-417. If only a person who can enforce can present, why do § 3-417(a) (I) and ((I) (1)
say that everyone who presents warrants that they have a right to enforce? The warranty would
be superfluous.
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feror," will make presentment warranties." 3 Similarly, section 3-
417(d) (1) states that, upon presentment of any other instrument, both
"the person obtaining payment" and "a prior transferor" make present-
ment warranties. 254
In many—indeed most—remitter transactions, the remitter will
transfer an instrument before its ultimate presentment. 255 For example,
in a typical case, a remitter will purchase an instrument from a bank
and then deliver it to the payee. The delivery constitutes a "transfer." 25°
If the payee then presents the check to the bank and obtains payment,
the remitter will qualify as a previous or prior transferor and will make
the presentment warranty or warranties applicable to the instrument.
Courts holding that remitters do not have the right to enforce
instruments again will encounter two difficulties. First, as in the case
of transfer warranties, they will have to conclude that the remitter
always breaches the warranty that the remitter is a person entitled to
enforce. Although that result does not make much sense, it follows
directly from the statute.
Second, these courts will have to decide whether remitters should
make presentment warranties if they deliver the instrument to some-
one other than the payee prior to its ultimate presentment. As noted
above, some courts would not consider such a delivery to constitute a
"transfer."2" The remitter thus could not qualify as a previous or prior
transferor. Nonetheless, courts still should impose the presentment
warranties stated in section 3-417(a) (2) and (3) as a matter of com-
mon law to prevent any unfair surprise.
D. Other Liability
Remitters do not face any additional forms of liability under article
3. Yet, they may incur liability independent of the Code. This liability,
in appropriate circumstances, could sound either in contract or tort.
When remitters purchase cashier's checks or teller's checks from
a bank, they may make express or implicit contracts with the issuing
bank. For example, if the remitter does not tender cash for the instru-
ment, the remitter usually will promise to pay for it later. If the remitter
255 Id. § 3-417(a).
254 Id. § 3-417(d)(1).
255 Why the Code says "previous transferor" in subsection (a), and "prior transferor" in
subsection (d)(I), remains unclear. The distinction does not appear to make a difference,
256 See supra Part IV.E.
257 See id.
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fails to pay—as sometimes happens258—the drawer may recover the
purchase price from the remitter under a breach of contract theory.
Additionally, remitters may face tort and related liability for vari-
ous forms of misconduct. For example, an issuer may have rights
against a remitter who obtains an instrument by fraud.'" Remitters who
use cashier's checks to defraud othersm similarly may have tort liability
to their victims. The details of these forms of liability fall outside of the
scope of this article. At least as a matter of policy, however, courts
should not hesitate to place upon remitters the same types of liabilities
that comparable parties to negotiable instrument fraud would face for
similar conduct.
VI. CONCLUSION
More work remains on the subject of remitters. Although this essay
has attempted to state their rights and liabilities under article 3, it has
not addressed a number of other topics. For example, the essay does
not investigate fully the extent to which parties may change the statu-
tory rules by contract, a perennial issue under the Code. In addition,
although the foregoing discussion has pointed out a number of
difficulties with the present language of article 3, it has not recom-
mended specific ways to remedy them.
Under the analysis presented here, however, the author hopes to
have simplified the task of deciding the vast majority of issues that arise
in remitter cases. Although article 3 says almost nothing expressly
about remitters, this essay has strived to show that many of the article's
general provisions clearly apply to them. Moreover, where the Code is
silent, courts may fashion appropriate common law rules to fill in the
gaps.
258 See, e.g., Godat v. Mercantile Bank, CIV. No. 63696, 1994 WL 313506, at *4 (Mo. Ct. App.
July 5, 1994) (remitter failed to pay for instrument); Wertz v. Richardson Heights Bank & Trust,
495 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. 1973) (same).
259 See BRITTON, SUptil note 60, at 300.
76° See supra Part LB.
